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DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT: JUSTICE SCALIA’S 
REGRETTABLE LEGACY OF INCIVILITY 
J. Lyn Entrikin* 
Just as we judge people by . . . the principles they reject as 
well as the values they affirmatively maintain, so do we 
look at judges’ dissents, as well as their decisions for the 
court, as we evaluate judicial careers.1
During his nearly thirty years on the Supreme Court, the 
late Justice Antonin Scalia earned a reputation for writing 
vitriolic dissents.2 Meanwhile, the general tone of civic 
discourse has become at best dismaying and at worst 
demoralizing.3 Justice Scalia did not live long enough to witness 
*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of 
Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the Law School’s 2016 summer research stipend 
in support of this article.    
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 428 (1986).  
2. E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 323 (2014) 
(noting that Justice Scalia stood alone for “consistently” writing “with sarcasm”); Brian 
Christopher Jones, Disparaging the Supreme Court: Is SCOTUS in Serious Trouble? 2015 
WIS. L. REV. FORWARD 53, 62 (referring to Justice Scalia’s “decadent language”); Richard 
L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic Justice, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 215, 215 (2015) (finding 
“unparalleled” Justice Scalia’s “nastiness, particularly directed at other Justices’ 
opinions”).
3. E.g., Clarence Thomas, Civility and Public Discourse, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 515, 
515–16 (1997) (“[C]ivility is disappearing from public discourse and public conduct. . . . 
[U]nless each of us . . . encourage[s] others, by example, to become more civil, we will be 
contributing to the erosion of the rules that allow our civil society to function.”); see also, 
e.g., Michael R. Wolf et al., Incivility and Standing Firm: A Second Layer of Partisan 
Division, 45 POL. SCI. & POLITICS 428, 428 (2012) (noting widespread concern that decline 
in tone of political discourse is “worse than ever,” threatens the “long-term stability of 
America’s governing institutions” and “damage[es] the ability to resolve complex public 
problems”); Erica Werner & Mark Sherman, Gorsuch: Trump’s Attacks on Judges 
“Disheartening,” “Demoralizing”, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.chicago 
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-gorsuch-supreme-court-hearings-20170321-story 
.html (“When anyone criticizes the honesty and integrity or the motives of a federal judge, 
I find that disheartening, I find that demoralizing.”). 
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the 2016 presidential campaign as it played out, nor could he 
have anticipated how his death would reduce partisan polemics 
to a new low.4 The political discourse characterizing the 2016 
presidential election represented the modern nadir of civility in 
the public square. 
Largely insulated from such outside political pressures, 
Supreme Court Justices long hewed to norms of civility, 
collegiality, and respect, even if not always reaching consensus. 
With few exceptions, the Justices have disagreed about even 
controversial legal issues in mutually respectful discourse. They 
have customarily demonstrated a deep appreciation for the 
Court’s role in our democracy, and an understanding that public 
respect and confidence in the Court’s institutional integrity is 
essential for its independence. 
Not so with Justice Scalia. His dissents frequently reflected 
uncloaked scorn for the majority.5 And although he has been 
celebrated in death as a brilliant judicial giant,6 his departure 
from the custom of respectful dissent marked a turning point in 
the Court’s tradition of collegiality and civility.7
4. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Scalia’s Death Plunges Court, National Politics into 
Turmoil, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/scalias-
death-plunges-court-national-politics-into-turmoil/2016/02/13/136c0590-d2a4-11e5-b2bc-
988409ee911b_story.html?utm_term=.cc6ba93ac167 (predicting political controversy that 
became a central feature of the 2016 presidential campaign); Jeffrey Toobin, In the 
Balance, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 2016, at 28 (“[T]he death of Antonin Scalia . . . jolted the 
institution and affirmed . . . a venerable truism, attributed to the late Justice Byron White: 
‘When you change one Justice, you change the whole Court.’”).
5. Despite the disdain Justice Scalia’s separate opinions often expressed for the views 
of his fellow Justices, he and they disavowed any internal conflict as a result. See, e.g.,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) 
(sidestepping the question by referring to her friendship with Justice Scalia); Antonin 
Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 33, 40–41 (Dec. 1994) (explaining 
that separate opinions “do not, or at least need not, produce animosity and bitterness among 
the members of the Court,” in which dissents are “normal”). 
6. E.g., Yury Kapgan, Of Golf and Ghouls: The Prose Style of Justice Scalia Love Him 
or Hate Him, Antonin Scalia Demands Attention, 9 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 71, 96 (2003) 
(referring to a quote from a dissent as “Scaliaesque”); Christina Pazzanese, Death of a 
Judicial Giant, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 15, 2016), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/ 
2016/02/death-of-a-judicial-giant/ (referring to Justice Scalia as “a legal giant and defender 
of conservative jurisprudence with a rapier wit and formidable intellect”).
7. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of 
Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 583, 623 (1994) (emphasizing that dissents are 
essential for maintaining institutional integrity, but urging civility in expressing strong 
judicial disagreement).  
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 48 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 48 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT 203
Given the regrettable and apparently unchecked decline in 
the civility of public discourse in all branches of our 
government,8 we might consider whether Justice Scalia’s 
increasingly vitriolic dissents set a new course for government 
speech. And if they did, we should consider the implications for 
his legacy. As one scholar observed, his “dissents have not won 
over many adherents, and in some areas, despite the force of his 
protest, he may well be on the wrong side of history.”9  Others 
have warned that “the nastiness among the Justices contributes 
to the lack of civility among lawyers.”10 Perhaps the “sting” of 
Justice Scalia’s aggressive rhetoric was “somewhat mitigated by 
its confinement, by and large, to dissents.”11 Or does a
disrespectful dissent by a Supreme Court Justice always set a 
bad example?12
Part I of this article reviews the Supreme Court’s history of 
issuing separate opinions. Part II maps the declining civility of 
Justice Scalia’s dissents during his four years as a circuit judge 
followed by three decades on the Court. Part III considers the 
extent to which Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence has influenced the 
law.13 Part IV assesses whether the increasingly divisive tone of 
Supreme Court dissents implicates judicial ethics and 
8. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 3, at 515–16. 
9. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: ITS ROLE IN THE 
COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 407 (2015).  
10. Gaffney, supra note 7, at 624; see also, e.g., Brian Porto, The Rhetorical Legacy of 
Antonin Scalia, 43 VT. B.J. 28, 28 (Summer 2017) (characterizing Justice Scalia’s tone as 
“prone to cross the rhetorical Rubicon between professional critique and personal attack”); 
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061, 1077 (1994) 
(suggesting that Justice Scalia may have “crossed the line between lively language and 
impermissibly caustic speech”); but cf. Thomas, supra note 3, at 516 (decrying decline of 
civility elsewhere but praising the Court, “where civility is . . . not a matter for debate”). 
11. Porto, supra note 10, at 29.
12. See Philip Allen Lacovara, Un-Courtly Manners: Quarrelsome Justices Are No 
Longer a Model of Civility for Lawyers, 80 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (Dec. 1994) (noting that the 
Supreme Court “is not immune” and “appears disinclined to lead the legal profession back 
toward more civilized discourse”); see also, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence 
of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 401 (2000) (chiding 
Justice Scalia for “the tone and rhetoric of his opinions”); Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere 
Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Legacy, Justice Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 
428 (2003) (addressing Justice Scalia in a public letter that apparently fell on deaf ears); 
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1077.
13. While dissenting opinions “can help to change the law,” Justice Scalia conceded 
that dissents in the federal courts of appeals are more likely to do so than Supreme Court 
dissents. Scalia, supra note 5, at 36–37, 41.  
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undermines civility among the bench and bar. Finally, Part V 
discusses whether Justice Scalia’s frequent departure from the 
custom of respectful dissent contributed to the increasingly 
negative tone of all contemporary government speech. The 
article concludes by suggesting steps the Court should take to 
ensure that Justices serve as exemplars of civility and respect in 
public discourse. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S OPINION-ISSUING PRACTICES
Supreme Court Justices have not always had the same 
attitude toward the expression of dissent.14
A. The Early Years 
For much of the Court’s early history, dissents were issued 
only rarely,15 and then often only reluctantly and even 
apologetically.16 Most of the earliest reported Supreme Court 
opinions—issued from 1790 to 1800—were written “by the 
Court,” without attribution by name to the opinion’s author.17
About one fourth were issued seriatim following the tradition of 
English courts, each Justice issuing an individual opinion. Often 
a seriatim opinion was followed by a brief order disposing of the 
case.18 History does not make clear why some of the earliest 
14.  John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 
1790–1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 137 (1999).
15. UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 46–47; Kelsh, supra note 14, at 146–48; Scalia, supra
note 5, at 34.  
16. See, e.g., Brown v. Md., 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 419, 449–50 (1827) (Thompson, J., 
dissenting) (announcing dissent “with some reluctance, and very considerable diffidence”); 
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 398 (1805) (Washington, J., dissenting) 
(feeling compelled to dissent to “shew at least that the opinion was not hastily or 
inconsiderately given”); see also Kelsh, supra note 14, at 159 & nn. 89, 133 (noting that 
Marshall Court dissenters routinely expressed respect for fellow Justices). 
17. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 140; see, e.g., United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 
121, 129 (1795) (“By the Court: We have consulted together on this motion; and, though a 
difference of sentiment exists, a majority of the Court are clearly of opinion, that the 
motion ought to be granted.”).
18. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 140; G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief 
Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2006); see also,
e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 37 (1800); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (Dall.) 14 (1800); 
Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 133 (1795); Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 
54 (1795); Ga. v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 402 (1792). 
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opinions were issued “by the Court” and others seriatim, but in 
the Court’s early years its opinions took no set form. 
Beginning in 1801, opinions were almost exclusively 
authored by Chief Justice John Marshall as a means of unifying 
the Court and establishing its institutional authority.19 After 
Justice William Johnson’s appointment in 1804, Chief Justice 
Marshall was persuaded to rotate opinion writing, and Justice 
Johnson occasionally issued separate opinions.20 Unanimity of 
the Court’s decisions weakened further later in the Marshall era. 
Chief Justice Marshall had his critics, including Thomas 
Jefferson,21 but his tight rein over the Court’s early opinion-
issuing practices has been recognized as entrenching the 
Supreme Court as a co-equal branch of government.22
B. The Beginnings of Respectful Dissent 
During Chief Justice Taney’s leadership, dissents were so 
uncommon that Justices often apologized for offering them.23
Typical are this introduction and conclusion: 
19. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 141–42; UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 46–47, 54; Cass 
Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 
786 (2015). 
20. See UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 50, 54.  
21. President Jefferson criticized Chief Justice Marshall’s approach to issuing opinions. 
Id. at 47–54. In retirement, President Jefferson commended Justice William Johnson—
among his appointees to the Court—for his practice of writing separately: 
I rejoice in the example you set of seriatim opinions. . . . Some of your brethren 
will be encouraged to follow it occasionally, and in time, it may be felt by all as 
a duty, and the sound practice of the primitive court be again restored. Why 
should not every judge be asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only 
by yea or nay? Besides ascertaining the fact of his opinion, which the public 
have a right to know, in order to judge whether it is impeachable or not, it would 
show whether the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus settle more exactly 
the weight of their authority. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Pres. of the U.S. (ret.), to William Johnson, J., S. Ct. of the 
U.S., 2 (June 12, 1823), TEACHING AM. HISTORY, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ 
library/document/letter-to-justice-william-johnson/; see also, e.g., Oliver Schroeder, Jr., 
The Life and Judicial Work of Justice William Johnson, Jr., 95 U. PA. L. REV. 164, 168 
(1946) (crediting Justice Johnson for altering the Court’s practice of issuing a single 
opinion and asserting that “concurring and dissenting opinions restored an ancient 
procedure which had been neglected”). 
22. E.g., UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
23. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 155. Indeed, from 1835 to 1941, fewer than ten percent of 
all Supreme Court opinions were accompanied by dissents. M. Todd Henderson, From 
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I dissent from the opinion of the court. The principle upon 
which the case is decided is so important, and will operate 
so widely, that I feel it my duty to show the grounds upon 
which I differ. This will be done as briefly as I can; for my 
object is to state the principles of law upon which my 
opinion is formed, rather than to argue them at length. 
. . . . . 
And believing, as I do, upon the best consideration I am 
able to give to the subject, that the decision and the 
principle upon which the opinion of the court founds itself 
is inapplicable to the case before us, and that if it is carried 
out to its legitimate results it will deprive the admiralty of 
power, [which is] useful, and indeed necessary, for the 
purposes of justice, and conferred on it by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, I must respectfully record 
my dissent.24
As the Court gradually took its place as a co-equal branch 
of government, Justices began writing separately to demonstrate 
the consistency of their individual views over time rather than to 
express disagreements on specific issues.25 Dissents began to 
underscore the Justices’ principles and views as separate 
individuals rather than as faceless members of the Court’s 
consensus.26 But even after separate opinions became less 
apologetic, they almost always used respectful rhetoric.27 Yet 
Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 321 
& tbl. 2 (2007).
24. Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. 583, 600–01, 617 (1857) (Taney, C.J., & Wayne, Grier & 
Clifford, JJ., dissenting). As suggested by the Taylor dissent, members of the Taney Court 
generally confined separate opinions to cases involving constitutional and other questions 
of far-reaching public concern. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 150, 155–56; see UROFSKY, supra 
note 9, at 57–58; e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 493 (1857) (Campbell, J., 
concurring) (“I concur in the judgment pronounced by the Chief Justice, but the importance 
of the cause, the expectation and interest it has awakened, and the responsibility involved 
in its determination, induce me to file a separate opinion.”), superseded by U.S. Const. 
amends. XIII, XIV.
25. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 157 (noting that “by the mid-nineteenth century, “Justices 
began to state that dissent was acceptable in order to protect or maintain their own records 
or reputations” and “began to defend dissent less by reference to the issues involved and 
more by reference to themselves”). 
26. See id. at 157–59 & n.130. 
27. Id. at 159 (“Marshall Court Justices had gone out of their way to express their 
respect for the opinions of their brethren.”).  
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there were exceptions. As early as 1854, a concurring Justice 
pointedly criticized the Court’s reasoning: 
[T]he decision . . . seems to me incomprehensible, unless 
understood as designed to overrule [Vidal v. Girard’s 
Executors], and every authority from the English chancery 
cited and commented upon in its support. For such an 
assault upon the previous decision of this court, wielding a 
blow so trenchant and fatal at one great and acknowledged 
head of equity jurisprudence, the head of trusts, my mind is 
not prepared.28
Illustrative of the Taney Court’s norms of internal 
collegiality and mutual respect is Dred Scott,29 the most divisive 
decision of the nineteenth century. The Justices’ nine separate 
opinions and the political controversy they engendered 
foreshadowed the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation, 
and later the adoption and ratification of the post-Civil War 
amendments to the Bill of Rights.30
Justices McLean and Curtis issued dissents, both respectful, 
cordial, and couched in lofty discourse.31 Justice McLean 
objected to anything in the majority opinion beyond its holding 
that the court below lacked jurisdiction, but he also respectfully 
addressed the central issue: 
In this case, a majority of the court have said that a slave 
may be taken by his master into a Territory of the United 
States, the same as a horse, or any other kind of property. 
. . . A slave is not a mere chattel. He bears the impress of 
28. Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 398 (1854) (Daniel, J., concurring) 
(citing Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 183 (1844)).
29. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Justice Ginsburg recently referred to Dred Scott as
“the most dreadful decision the Court ever wrote.” A Conversation with Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Professor Aaron Saiger, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2017) 
[hereinafter Ginsburg Conversation]. 
30. While Chief Justice Taney authored the majority opinion, for all practical purposes 
the case was decided seriatim because each Justice issued a separate opinion. Dred Scott,
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399–454 (Taney, C.J.); id. at 454–56 (Wayne, J., concurring); 457–69 
(Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring); id. at 469–93 (Daniel, J., 
concurring); id. at 493–518 (Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 518–29 (Catron, J., 
concurring); id. at 529–64 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564–633 (Curtis, J., dissenting).  
31. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 
ABA J. 794, 797 (Sept. 1953) (quoting a portion of Justice Curtis’s dissent as “a model of 
temperate, reasoned discussion of a hotly debated legal-political controversy in a time of 
exceptional political excitement”). 
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his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; 
and he is destined to an endless existence.32
Justice Curtis wrote more forcefully, but still respectfully: 
If this power [to declare who is a citizen] exists, what 
persons born within the States may be President or Vice 
President of the United States, or members of either House 
of Congress, or hold any office or enjoy any privilege 
whereof citizenship of the United States is a necessary 
qualification, must depend solely on the will of Congress.33
. . . . . 
Whatever individual claims may be founded on local 
circumstances, or sectional differences of condition, cannot 
. . . be recognized in this court, without arrogating to the 
judicial branch . . . powers not committed to it; and which 
. . . I do not think it fitted to wield.34
And Justice Curtis concluded in an almost apologetic tone, 
explaining his reasons for writing separately: 
I have expressed my opinion, and the reasons therefor, at 
far greater length than I could have wished, upon the 
different questions on which I have found it necessary to 
pass . . . . These questions are numerous, and the grave 
importance of some of them required me to exhibit fully the 
grounds of my opinion. . . . To have done either more or 
less, would have been inconsistent with my views of my 
duty.35
During Chief Justice Taney’s later years and as the Civil 
War approached, the tone of separate opinions shifted from the 
norm of respect to reflect increasing hostility. Justices became 
32. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 549–50 (McLean, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 577–78 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 626 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 633 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Even the concurring opinion by Justice Wayne 
was respectful, and almost apologetic, in commenting on the badly divided decision: 
It would certainly be a subject of regret, that the conclusions of the court have 
not been assented to by all of its members, if I did not know from its history and 
my own experience how rarely it has happened that the judges have been 
unanimous upon constitutional questions of moment, and if our decision in this 
case had not been made by as large a majority of them as has been usually had 
on constitutional questions of importance. 
Id. at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring). 
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less concerned about the Court’s role as an institution and 
instead focused their attention on their individual reputations.36
C. The Separate Opinion in a Time of Socioeconomic Turmoil 
After Chief Justice Taney’s death in 1864, Supreme Court 
Justices filed separate opinions in an expanding range of cases, 
even while continuing to express reluctance in doing so.37 But 
some Justices also occasionally issued unapologetic separate 
opinions expressing disdain for the Court’s opinions.38
By the late nineteenth century, separate opinions were no 
longer considered out of the ordinary. In 1892, a brief dissent 
issued by Justice Brewer39 expressly relied on the “elaborate 
discussions” by dissenting Justices in an earlier case, a highly 
unusual practice at the time.40 Also during this period, dissents 
occasionally became law, either by constitutional amendment41
or by the Court’s overruling earlier decisions in favor of 
dissenting viewpoints.42 No doubt the political impact of the 
Court’s reversals on the controversial issues of the day offered 
36. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 157–59 & n.130. 
37. Id. at 160, 161–66. 
38. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), for example, Justice Field wrote that “[t]he 
principle upon which the opinion of the majority proceeds is, in my judgment, subversive 
of the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected by constitutional 
guaranties against legislative interference, and is in conflict with the authorities cited in its 
support.” Id. at 136 (Field, J., dissenting).
39. Budd v. N.Y., 143 U.S. 517, 548–49 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
40. Kelsh, supra note 14, at 172 (discussing Munn).
41. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV (overruling Dred Scott).
42. E.g., The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (overruling Hepburn 
v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870)). The dissent in Hepburn, joined by three 
Justices, was particularly strident in tone, and was perhaps among the earliest critiques of 
what is now known as judicial activism: 
[The majority’s] whole argument of the injustice of the law, an injustice which if 
it ever existed will be repeated by now holding it wholly void; and of its 
opposition to the spirit of the Constitution, is too abstract and intangible for 
application to courts of justice, and is, above all, dangerous as a ground on 
which to declare the legislation of Congress void by the decision of a court. It 
would authorize this court to enforce theoretical views of the genius of the 
government, or vague notions of the spirit of the Constitution and of abstract 
justice, by declaring void laws which did not square with those views. It 
substitutes our ideas of policy for judicial construction, an undefined code of 
ethics for the Constitution, and a court of justice for the National legislature. 
Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 638 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
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an irresistible incentive for minority Justices to express 
dissenting viewpoints.43
D. The Anti-Dissent Movement 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the bar began to 
express strong opposition to the practice of issuing dissents.44
The opposition was motivated primarily by two concerns.  First, 
separate opinions weakened the judiciary’s institutional 
authority45 by undermining the certainty and predictability of the 
law. Second, they were antithetical to the collective nature of 
courts and the appropriate role of judges.46 Yet separate opinions 
could also reflect the democratic notion that courts, like 
legislatures, are deliberative bodies. The practice of announcing 
dissenting viewpoints was said to reflect the transparency and 
public access valued in the American judicial system.47
43. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) (Field, J., 
dissenting). Professor Urofsky calls Justice Field’s dissent in The Slaughter-House Cases
the “first modern dissent” because “it not only contradicted the ruling and reasoning of the 
majority, but also set out the arguments that would ultimately be accepted as correct.” 
Melvin I. Urofsky, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Art of Judicial Dissent, 39 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 919, 922–23 (2012).  
Yet some Justices of this era circulated proposed dissents primarily to influence the 
content and reasoning of opinions for the Court. Justice Brandeis, for example, wrote 
dissents that he later withheld from publication. Id. at 929; see generally ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT WORK 200 (1957). 
44. Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century Lawyers and 
the Dissenting Opinion, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 508–09 (2012) (summarizing the 
thirty-year debate about publishing dissents in courts of last resort); see also C.A. 
Hereschoff Bartlett, Dissenting Opinions, 32 L. MAG. & REV. 54, 55 (Nov. 1906) (“What 
possible good can result from a dissenting opinion? . . . It simply litters up pages of law 
reports with divergent views, the dissenting judge frequently posing as the champion of a 
lost cause.”)  
45. See Smith, supra note 44, at 518–19.  
46. See id. at 540; see also Henry Wollman, Evils of Dissenting Opinions, 57 ALB. L.J. 
74, 74 (1898) (“There never should be a dissenting opinion in a case decided by a court of 
last resort. No judge, lawyer or layman should be permitted to weaken the force of the 
court’s decision, which all must accept as an unappealable finality.”).  
47. See Emlin McClain, Dissenting Opinions, 14 YALE L.J. 191, 192, 195–96 (1905). 
Some commentators celebrated Supreme Court dissents:  
There is a class of dissenting opinions however which is well worthy of the 
closest attention on the part of the American bar. They are marked . . . by certain 
peculiarities which give them permanent value. I refer to the dissenting opinions 
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Perhaps as a result of the legal uncertainty associated with 
separate opinions, they became increasingly unpopular with the 
bar.48 Legal periodicals and general-interest newspapers alike 
took positions for and against, and the question was frequently 
debated at bar meetings.49 One trigger may have been Plessy v. 
Ferguson,50 which reaffirmed the “separate but equal” doctrine 
by upholding a Louisiana statute requiring segregated railway 
cars.51 In dissent, Justice Harlan pointedly challenged the 
Court’s reasoning: 
The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race 
while they are on a public highway is a badge of servitude 
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality 
before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be 
justified upon any legal grounds.52
Soon after Plessy, Louisiana amended its constitution to prohibit 
minority opinions.53  But by 1921, the opposition movement lost 
force as judicial dissent came to be viewed as a sign of the 
delivered by members of the Supreme Court of the United States upon questions 
of constitutional law. 
Hampton L. Carson, Great Dissenting Opinions, 50 ALB. L.J. 120, 120 (1894) (conceding
nevertheless that “[t]he active practitioner is chiefly concerned with the law as it is 
declared by the majority of a court, and pays little heed to a shrill or feeble shriek as to 
what it might or ought to be”).
48. E.g., William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690, 693 (1905) 
(calling dissents “judicial mistakes” that injured “public respect for courts”); McClain, 
supra note 47, at 198 (noting that dissents are “in many cases . . . unwise and injudicious”). 
49. Smith, supra note 44, at 511–12. 
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled in part, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–
95 (1954).
51. Id. at 543, 549–51. 
52. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). And Justice Harlan had more to say: 
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways 
established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will 
surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon 
the basis of race. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other 
peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, 
practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our 
fellow citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of “equal” 
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor 
atone for the wrong this day done. 
Id.
53. Smith, supra note 44, at 513 & n.36 (citing LA. CONST. art. 92 (adopted 1898; 
rescinded 1921)). 
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common law’s adaptability54 rather than “a pernicious, private 
indulgence.”55
E. The Rise of Consensus and Acquiescence 
Chief Justice Taft chaired the commission that drafted the 
ABA’s first code of judicial conduct, issued in 1924.56 No fan of 
dissents,57 he urged restraint by dissenting Justices, promoting 
the addition of Canon 19 titled “Judicial Opinions.”58 The canon 
acknowledged that a written opinion “promotes confidence in 
[the judge’s] intellectual integrity and may contribute useful 
precedent to the growth of the law.”59 But it discouraged courts 
of last resort from issuing separate opinions, urging judges to 
exercise “effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of 
conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision.”60
54. McClain, supra note 47, at 193–94 (describing written opinions’ essential function 
as guiding others on force and effect of court rulings on facts presented); Smith, supra note 
44, at 538. 
55. Smith, supra note 44, at 538.  As early as 1905, some considered dissents “not only 
proper, but necessary” in some cases and that suppressing dissent would likely “obstruct 
. . . the harmonious and safe development of the law.” McClain, supra note 47, at 199. But 
the potential for abuse was obvious even then: “The writer of the dissent has a decided 
advantage in that his work is in the main critical and destructive rather than constructive.” 
Id.
56. Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model 
Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUSTICE SYS. J. 271, 273 (2007) (reviewing the history 
of the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics).  
57. Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the Judges’ Bill 
and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. QUARTERLY 471, 481 (1977) 
(observing that the Court’s marked increase in dissenting opinions began while Taft was 
Chief Justice, “despite his strong antipathy to dissent” and his tradition of discouraging 
dissents “for the sake of institutional unity”).
58. John Alder, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices? 20 OXFORD J. OF 
LEG. STUDIES 221, 244 (2000); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional 
Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267, 1284 & n.55, 1344–45, 1346, 1348, 1356 (2001) (describing Court’s 
involvement in drafting Canon 19 as reflecting norm of consensus in the 1920s and noting 
that Canon 19 survived until 1972, when the Code was substantially revised). The ABA’s 
Code-revision committee considered Canon 19’s “detailed discussion of judicial 
opinions . . . as neither being helpful nor, for the most part, matters of ethical conduct.” E.
WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 50 (1973).
59. ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, at Canon 19 (1924), available at https://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/pic_migrated/ 
1924_canons.authcheckdam.pdf (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Canons]
60. Id.
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Perhaps anticipating the Scaliaesque dissent, Canon 19 noted 
that
[a] judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more 
highly his individual reputation than that of a court to 
which he should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious 
difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting 
opinions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.61
Ironically, the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics never applied to 
federal judges, and Canon 19 has been cited only rarely.62
Another major event probably mitigated the influence of 
Canon 19. The Judiciary Act of 1925 significantly altered the 
nature of the Supreme Court’s docket and generated more time 
for Justices to write separate opinions.63 The Court itself had 
urged Congress to enact the bill “to cope with the growth in its 
business and to conserve its energies for issues appropriate to 
the Supreme Bench.”64
With few exceptions, the Act essentially eliminated cases 
over which the Court’s review was mandatory and granted it 
authority to control its own docket through writs of certiorari.65
By this time, dissents were entrenched in the Court’s practice,66
and the statutory changes allowed the Justices sufficient time to 
prepare, circulate, and deliberate over their dissents, which 
“entail[ed] as much labor as majority opinions.”67 No longer 
bound to resolve routine appeals, the Court accepted cases much 
61. Id.
62. One of the few cases to cite Canon 19 was State ex rel. Shea v. Judicial Standards 
Comm’n, 643 P.2d 210, 223 (Mont. 1982). The Montana court declined to sanction a judge 
for using “intemperate” language in a dissent, concluding that “[a]s long as a justice, or a 
judge . . . does not resort to profane, vulgar or insulting language that offends good morals, 
it may hardly be considered ‘misconduct in office.’” Id.
63. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 794–95 (describing cases). 
64. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act 
of 1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1928); see also id. at 4 (“Indeed, the Act was an effort by 
the Court to cut the coat of jurisdiction according to the cloth of the time and energy of the 
nine Justices.”). 
65. Id. at 1–3; Halpern & Vines, supra note 57, at 472. The Judiciary Act of 1925 is 
generally considered a watershed in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence, not only 
because it gave the Court considerable discretion over the nature of the cases it decided, 
but also because it substantially reduced the Court’s caseload. See Halpern & Vines, supra
note 57, at 482–83. 
66. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 64, at 15 (“Its practice may well be characterized 
as one of the settled traditions of the Court.”). 
67. Id. at 15–18 (including tables that show distribution of opinions). 
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more likely to present challenging issues,68 especially during 
and after the New Deal era. The controversial socioeconomic 
issues raised in these cases understandably prompted more 
disagreement among Justices. 
In 1928, Charles Evans Hughes—then a former Justice of 
the Supreme Court who would soon be appointed Chief 
Justice—delivered a series of lectures at Columbia University. 
They included his famous statement about the dissent’s appeal 
“to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future 
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been 
betrayed.”69 But that lofty, often-quoted passage is almost 
always taken out of context. While Justice Hughes generally 
valued minority opinions, at least in “important controversies,”70
he conceded that dissents “detract from the force of the 
[majority’s] judgment.”71 Read in proper context, his 
perspective on dissents was more equivocal than has generally 
been reported.
His published lectures certainly reflect that Justice Hughes 
valued judicial civility, even in separate opinions.  After noting 
that a court’s reputation rests on the “character and 
independence of its judges,” he pointed out that 
[t]his does not mean that a judge should be swift to dissent, 
or that he should dissent for the sake of self-exploitation or 
because of a lack of that capacity for cooperation which is 
of the essence of any group action, whether judicial or 
otherwise. Independence does not mean cantankerousness 
and a judge may be a strong judge without being an 
impossible person. Nothing is more distressing on any 
bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient, 
querulous spirit.72
68. Id.
69. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS—AN INTERPRETATION 68 (1928). 
70. Id. at 70; see also id. at 64–70 (discussing opinions in general). 
71. Id. at 67. “Undoubtedly, they do. When unanimity can be obtained without sacrifice 
of conviction, it strongly commends the decision to public confidence.” Id.
72. Id. at 67–68. 
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F. (Mostly) Respectful Dissent on the Roosevelt Court 
After 1941, when Harlan Fiske Stone was appointed Chief 
Justice, the Court’s consensus norm ended at a remarkable 
pace.73 Chief Justice Stone did not believe he was empowered to 
discourage Justices from publicly disagreeing with the majority. 
In fact, he believed dissents were the natural result of thoughtful 
debate and deliberation on controversial issues.74
Chief Justice Stone’s internal administrative innovations 
transformed the inner workings of the Court into nine “separate 
law offices, with individual Justices elaborating their own 
views.”75 But his leadership was not the only reason for the 
decline in consensus. Much of the change is probably 
attributable to the Court’s significant turnover during the 
Roosevelt years. Between 1937 and 1941 alone, President 
Roosevelt nominated eight new Justices.76
Before 1947, official case reports identified by name only 
the Justice who authored the Court’s opinion or any separate 
opinion, unless another Justice specifically asked to be identified 
with a particular opinion. But once the front matter of every 
opinion identified each Justice’s position, silent acquiescence 
became less frequent and draft opinions began circulating 
among the Justices. Thus, Justices became personally (and 
73. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 789.
74. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 177–79; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 789–90. Stone 
himself dissented more frequently than any previous Chief Justice. Sunstein, supra note 19, 
at 790.  
75. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 789–90. 
76. Id. at 775 & n.30. He nominated another in 1943 to replace one of those eight, who 
resigned after two years to serve in the Roosevelt administration. 
President Roosevelt’s appointment of academics, including Felix Frankfurter and 
William O. Douglas, may also have shifted the Court’s internal dynamic toward the robust 
disagreements that sometimes characterize law faculty meetings. See id. at 793. Justices 
Frankfurter and Douglas both had “strong personalities” and “had not been fully socialized 
into a judicial culture that prized a norm of consensus.” Id.  Justice Frankfurter’s judicial 
brethren also disliked his “pedantic” dissents and “condescending” attitude. One Court 
scholar concluded,  
As his dream of leading the Court slipped away, Frankfurter grew nastier and his 
temper shorter. The papers of the [J]ustices who served with him are littered 
with notes from Frankfurter accusing them of everything from stupidity to the 
inability to understand the law; what he said behind their backs, and in his diary, 
usually went much further.  
UROFSKY, supra note 9, at 232.  
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perhaps even politically) accountable for their respective 
positions, which may have prompted more frequent separate 
opinions.77 In addition, the jurisprudential shift away from 
formalism to realism during this period likely influenced the 
pattern and frequency of minority opinions.78
G. The Norm of Consensus and Respect in the Civil Rights Era 
By the mid-twentieth century, some dissents had become 
more strident, and scholars called for more civility and 
restraint.79 In 1954, soon after Earl Warren became Chief 
Justice, the Court unanimously decided Brown v. Board of 
Education.80 And after 1957, dissenters adopted the customary 
tone of the “respectful dissent.”81 Under Chief Justice Warren, 
the Court demonstrated a surprising degree of consensus—and 
even occasional unanimity—in many of that era’s controversial 
civil rights cases, including not only Brown but also Bates v. 
City of Little Rock,82 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States,83 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,84 and Loving v. 
Virginia.85
77. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 797; see also id. at 802. 
78. Id. at 798. 
79. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 31, at 795–97 (pointedly critiquing dissents of 
California Supreme Court Justice Jesse W. Carter). 
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Scholars have credited the Court’s unanimity in Brown to
Chief Justice Warren’s leadership. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Rule of Law and the 
Achievement of Unanimity in Brown, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 749–50 (2004) 
(recognizing unanimity as Chief Justice Warren’s “signal achievement”); Dennis J. 
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–
1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34 (1979).  
81. Chris Kulawik, Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the 
“Respectful” Dissent, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1317–18 (2011) (crediting Justice 
Whittaker with using the phrase that has since become the customary language of collegial 
disagreement); see also id. at 1318 & n.87. Yet Chief Justice Taney was apparently the first 
Justice to adopt the phrase. See Thomas v. Osborn, 60 U.S. 22, 56 (1856) (Taney, C.J., 
dissenting). And other dissenting Justices recited it before the phrase first appeared in a 
dissent authored by Justice Whittaker. Compare Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 71 
(1957) (Clark, J., dissenting), with City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of Am., 355 U.S. 489, 
511 (1958) (Whittaker, J., dissenting).
82. 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (addressing freedom of association). 
83. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (applying Civil Rights Act to private businesses).
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reaffirming freedom of the press). 
85. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down statutes banning interracial marriage). 
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The tradition of respect continued for almost thirty years, 
even in Roe v. Wade,86 certainly among the most divisive cases 
of the modern era.87 Then-Justice Rehnquist, for example, 
adopted a polite and deferential tone in his Roe dissent: 
The Court’s opinion brings to the decision of this troubling 
question both extensive historical fact and a wealth of legal 
scholarship. While the opinion thus commands my respect, 
I find myself nonetheless in fundamental disagreement with 
those parts of it that invalidate the Texas statute in 
question, and therefore dissent.88
But once Justice Scalia arrived in 1986, the tone of 
Supreme Court discourse would never be the same.89
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
87. E.g., Bret D. Asbury, Law as Palimpsest: Conceptualizing Contingency in Judicial 
Opinions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 121, 144 (2009) (“Roe is one of the most widely read and 
controversial opinions of the twentieth century”).
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist ended his dissent 
with the then-customary phrase: “For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.” 
Id. at 178. Justice White issued a more strongly worded dissent in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
179 (1973), decided with Roe, but he too adopted a nominally respectful tone:  
With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the 
Constitution to support the Court’s judgments. . . . As an exercise of raw judicial 
power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view 
its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial 
review that the Constitution extends to this Court.  
. . . . . 
In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable 
men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court’s exercise of its 
clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to 
protect human life and by investing women and doctors with the constitutionally 
protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with 
the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their 
affairs.
Id. at 221–22 (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Others have reached similar 
conclusions about the respectful separate opinions in Roe. See, e.g., Ronald J. Placone, The 
United States Supreme Court and Abortion: A Decline in Civility, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
181, 190–91 (2011).
89. Alan B. Morrison, Remembering Justice Antonin Scalia, 101 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 12, 12 (2016) (surmising that Justice Scalia was confirmed in part because he 
had “no record that would suggest how he would vote in controversial cases before the 
Supreme Court”). “[T]o many who thought they knew Judge Scalia reasonably well when 
he was appointed, he turned out to be a much different Justice than they had expected.” Id.
at 14. But some of the opinions he wrote as a circuit judge suggested that he could be 
irascible, impatient, and aggressive.  See, e.g., text accompanying notes 137–59, infra.
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S RHETORICAL LEGACY
We write what we are, and perhaps, more than others, 
judges are what they write.90
Were Justice Scalia’s separate opinions motivated by a 
genuine desire to appeal to the “brooding spirit of the law, the 
intelligence of a future day”? Or was he too “swift to dissent,” 
choosing to “dissent for the sake of self-exploitation” for lack of 
“capacity for cooperation”? Was he, in the end, just a 
“cantankerous” and “impossible person” with a “captious, 
impatient, querulous spirit”?91
By the end of his life, Justice Scalia’s propensity to dissent 
was notably greater than might have been expected from his 
early years on the federal bench. He acknowledged in a 1994 
article that “[t]he foremost and undeniable external consequence 
of a separate dissenting or concurring opinion is to destroy the 
appearance of unity and solidarity.”92 And he agreed that the 
unanimity of the Court’s “epochal decision” in Brown facilitated 
its acceptance during the highly charged political controversy 
surrounding school desegregation. He conceded that separate 
opinions can “obfuscate rather than clarify” the law.93 And he 
recognized that they may lead to “a sort of vote-counting 
approach” in predicting Court decisions on significant issues of 
law.94
90. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1415 (1995). 
91. HUGHES, supra note 69, at 68.  
92. Scalia, supra note 5, at 35; see also Antonin Scalia, Dissents, OAH MAG. HISTORY
18 (1998) (restating this conviction in a slightly edited version of 1994 article). Indeed, “if 
the Court is persistently fragmented, and if the fragmentation occurs along political 
grounds, some people will lose faith in it—especially if their preferred views are 
consistently rejected.” Sunstein, supra note 19, at 816; but cf. Micah Schwartzman, 
Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1019 (2008) (defending judicial “candor” and 
“sincerity” but lamenting judicial critiques of one another “in disrespectful terms”).
93. Scalia, supra note 5, at 38. 
94. Id. at 39. Justice Scalia’s writing also presaged the political reaction to news of his 
death: “Whenever one of the five Justices in a 5–4 constitutional decision has been 
replaced there is a chance, astute counsel must think, of getting that decision overruled.” 
Id.; see supra note 4 and accompanying text; cf. Sunstein, supra note 19, at 806–07 
(arguing that the credibility and legitimacy of a deeply divided decision likely have more to 
do with public predilections than vote-counting).  
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On the other hand, Justice Scalia also apparently believed 
that an opinion for the Court, signed by its author and 
accompanied by signed dissents, demonstrates that the Court’s 
work is the product of “independent and thoughtful minds,” 
rather than the product of judges who value consensus merely to 
achieve “some supposed ‘good of the institution.’”95 In 
concluding that the merits of separate opinions outweigh their 
disadvantages, Justice Scalia’s thoughts mirrored the perspective 
espoused decades earlier by Chief Justice Hughes. He even 
acknowledged that concurring opinions issued “only to say the 
same thing better than the court has done, or worse still, to 
display the intensity of the concurring judge’s feelings on the 
issue” amount to an abuse that might even counsel against 
issuing separate opinions.96
Yet after serving on the federal bench for less than a 
decade, Justice Scalia had already earned a reputation for his 
biting, acerbic dissents.97 By the end of his judicial career, his 
separate opinions had been variously described as “harshly 
worded,”98 “sarcastic and divisive with a cutting writing style,”99
“acid,”100 “corrosive,”101 belligerent,102 “hostil[e],”103
95. Scalia, supra note 5, at 35. 
96. Id. at 33. Yet Justice Scalia’s concurring opinions often appeared to do just that.  
97. See infra notes 157–225 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia himself once 
conceded that his tone could be “sharp.” But “sharpness is sometimes needed to 
demonstrate how much of a departure I believe a thing is. Especially in my dissents.” 
Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), nymag.com/ 
news/features/Antonin-scalia-2013f-10/. In one of his last dissents, Justice Scalia attempted 
to rationalize the use of “extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and 
expression” in concurring or dissenting opinions, while chastising the majority for doing so 
in “the official opinion of the Court.” Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2630 (2015) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
98. Paul D. Clement, Why We Read the Scalia Opinion First, 101 JUDICATURE 53, 54 
(2017).
99. Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 399 (“No justice in Supreme Court history has 
consistently written with the sarcasm of Justice Scalia. No doubt, this makes his opinions 
among the most entertaining to read.”); Hasen, supra note 2, at 215, 224–27 (listing 
seventy-five sarcastic Scalia opinions); Kapgan, supra note 6, at 85 (“Sarcasm is indeed 
par for Scalia’s course.” (citing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700 (2001) (Scalia 
& Thomas, JJ., dissenting)); Adam Liptak, Scalia Lands at Top of Sarcasm Index of 
Justices. Shocking, N.Y. TIMES, at A10 (Jan. 19, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/01/20/us/scalia-lands-at-top-of-sarcasm-index-of-justices-shocking.html?_r=0. 
100. Liptak, supra note 99. 
101. Michael O’Donnell, What’s the Point of a Supreme Court Dissent? NATION, https: 
//www.thenation.com/article/whats-the-point-of-a-supreme-court-dissent/ (Jan. 21, 2016) 
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“caustic,”104 “invective,”105 “degrading,”106 “brutal,”107 “outside
the boundaries of judicial discourse,”108 “strident and 
contentious,”109 “bold vitriol,”110 a “torrent of outrage,”111
“prone to stylish stabs,”112 “vituperative,”113 and even 
“nasty.”114 They were perhaps written as much to garner 
attention115 and entertain116 as to enlighten readers.117 Justice 
(“[C]orrosive rhetoric like Scalia’s does more than fray relationships on the Court; it 
convinces the public that the justices are political stooges.”). 
102. David A. Yalof et al., Collegiality Among U.S. Supreme Court Justices? 95
JUDICATURE 12, 13 (July–Aug. 2011) (“During his nearly two decades on the Rehnquist 
Court, Scalia cemented his reputation as a stubborn and recalcitrant character, relentlessly 
attacking those who might disagree with his ideology or judging philosophy.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
103. Edward L. Rubin, Question Regarding D.C. v. Heller: As a Justice, Antonin Scalia 
Is (a) Great, (b) Acceptable, (c) Injudicious, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2008) (noting 
several instances of “hostility” in Heller dissent)). Professor Rubin acknowledged Justice 
Scalia’s “energetically articulated opinions,” id. at 1110, while noting the different 
rhetorical styles used in his dissents and his opinions for the Court. Rubin’s answer to the 
question posed in his title was “injudicious.” Id.at 1130. 
104. Wald, supra note 90, at 1416.
105. Thomas Przybylowski, Note, A Man of Genius Makes No Mistakes: Judicial 
Civility and the Ethics of the Opinion, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1257, 1261 (2016).
106. David Kravitz, Why We Should Ignore Justice Scalia’s Nasty Zingers, WASH.
POST (July 31, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-scalias-appalling-
zingers/2015/07/31/0f5db50c-36f5-11e5-b673-1df005a0fb28_story.html?utm_term=.f5ae0 
ff93ec0.
107. Michael J. Gerhardt, Justice Scalia's Legacies, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 221, 229 
(2017).
108. Rubin, supra note 103, at 1129 n.144.
109. Id. at 1130.  
110. Jones, supra note 2, at 62 (referring specifically to Justice Scalia’s June 2015 
dissents in King and Obergefell). 
111. David Auerbach, R-E-S-P-E-C-T, Find Out What It Means to Scalia, LEX.I.CON
VALLEY: A BLOG ABOUT LANGUAGE (June 26, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/lexicon 
_valley/2015/06/26/the_surprising_history_of_the_respectful_dissent_at_the_supreme_cou
rt.html; see also Kapgan, supra note 6, at 86 (“‘[A]t times [Justice Scalia’s rejection of 
abortion rights] has swelled over banks and turned into a torrent of abuse submerging the 
ordinarily depersonalized language of opinions.’” (quoting RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR.,
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 277 (1997)). 
112. Wald, supra note 90, at 1383.  
113. Porto, supra note 10, at 30.
114. Kravitz, supra note 106; O’Donnell, supra note 101; see also Hasen, supra note 2, 
at 215 (“[Justice Scalia’s] ability (and willingness) to engage in nastiness, particularly 
directed at other Justices’ opinions, is unparalleled.”); Yalof et al., supra note 102, at 13 
(quoting Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Justices Need to Regain Civility, USA TODAY, May 
14, 1991, at 7A)). 
115. Hasen, supra note 2, at 216 (opining that Justice Scalia’s sarcasm “gain[s] 
attention for his ideas”); Kapgan, supra note 6, at 74 (describing Justice Scalia’s prose as 
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Scalia once surmised that law students might no longer need to 
read academic writings about legal controversies because 
“[t]hose controversies appear in the opposing opinions of the 
Supreme Court itself, and can be studied from that text.”118 His 
self-professed motive for writing dissents was his desire to keep 
the Court “at the forefront of the intellectual development of the 
law,” even if it meant ceding influence to the legal academy, 
albeit sometimes only dismissively.119
Justice Scalia’s early writings shed no light on the reasons 
for the decline in civility his separate opinions exhibited over the 
years. Occasionally, his dissents reflected what might be 
considered merely acerbic wit, as when he referred to the 
Court’s statutory interpretation as “sheer applesauce.”120 By 
“compelling—demanding of attention”); see also O’Donnell, supra note 101 (”Justices
have become so accustomed to having their say that they rarely put the Court’s prestige 
above their own reputations.”). 
116. Kravitz, supra note 106 (“Scalia’s zingers add nothing of substance to his 
opinions; they are there to entertain, not to explain or enlighten.”); see also Clement, supra 
note 98, at 53 (noting that while Justice Scalia’s writing was entertaining, “it had serious 
consequences for the Court and its jurisprudence”).  At times Justice Scalia injected humor 
into his opinions, which occasionally defused some of his intemperance. Of his textualist 
jurisprudence, for example, he once wrote that “the acid test of whether a word can 
reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense at a 
cocktail party without having people look at you funny.” Johnson v. United States, 529 
U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
117. Perhaps he wrote separately for his own amusement. Justice Scalia found 
professional satisfaction in issuing separate opinions: “To be able to write an opinion solely 
for oneself, without the need to accommodate the views of one’s colleagues; . . . to express 
precisely the degree of quibble, or foreboding, or disbelief, or indignation that one believes 
the majority’s disposition should engender—that is indeed an unparalleled pleasure.” 
Scalia, supra note 5, at 42; see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 
(1960) (“[T]he right to dissent is the only thing that makes life tolerable for a judge of an 
appellate court.”). Justice Scalia confessed that the pleasure of writing separate opinions 
was “the most important of all.” Scalia, supra note 5, at 42. 
118. Scalia, supra note 5, at 39; see also Clement, supra note 98, at 55 (“Scalia, ever 
the law professor, had a great feel for that audience. . . . [S]tudents confess that they always 
read the Scalia opinion first—even students who almost always disagreed with the Justice. 
And who could blame them? Not only would the Scalia opinion lay the question bare and 
articulate one side of the legal debate clearly and cogently, it would be a fun read.”)  
119. Justice Scalia, himself a former law professor, exhibited disdain for academics on 
more than one occasion. In one dissent he derisively declared that it was “indeed a 
wonderful new world that the Court creates, one full of promise for administrative-law 
professors in need of tenure articles . . . .” Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’n Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2121 (2015).
120. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 113 (2007) (Scalia, 
Thomas & Souter, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The sheer applesauce of this statutory 
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2015, however, his increasingly frequent dissents121 had long 
reflected a harsh, vitriolic tone. The well-reasoned, temperate, 
and concise separate opinions he sometimes wrote in his early 
years as a judge became the exception. Some of his last dissents 
reflected disrespectful judicial rhetoric at its worst. But although 
his unusually biting rhetoric drew repeated criticism from Court 
observers122 with some urging him to change his ways,123 Justice 
Scalia neither listened nor seemed to care.124
This Part traces the evolution of Justice Scalia’s rhetorical 
style as expressed in his separate opinions beginning in 1982 
when he joined the D.C. Circuit. While a complete chronology 
of Justice Scalia’s dissents is beyond the scope of this article, the 
next three subsections illustrate the change in rhetorical style of 
his dissents over the years.
interpretation should be obvious.”); see also King v. Burwell, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 
2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (referring to Court’s reasoning 
as “pure applesauce”). Justice Scalia did not confine his witticisms to his dissents. Writing 
for the Court, he once observed that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of 
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, 
hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 
(2001).
121. In the last of his twenty-nine full terms, Justice Scalia issued thirteen dissents. 
122. E.g., Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783 
(2017) (book review); Noel J. Francisco, A Law Clerk’s Reflections on Justice Scalia 
(Aug. 4, 2016), available at https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/law-clerks-reflections-
justice-scalia; Gerhardt, supra note 107; Robert G. Gibson, In Memory of Justice Antonin 
Scalia, 28 DCBA BRIEF 16 (May 2016); Stephen A. Newman, Political Advocacy on the 
Supreme Court: The Damaging Rhetoric of Antonin Scalia, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 907 
(2006); Porto, supra note 10; Jeffrey M. Shaman, Justice Scalia and the Art of Rhetoric, 28 
CONST. COMMENT. 287 (2012). 
123. E.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 399–400 (citing examples and concluding 
that “this [rhetoric] sends exactly the wrong message to law students and attorneys about 
what type of discourse is appropriate in a formal legal setting and how it is acceptable to 
speak to one another.”); Failinger, supra note 12 (chronicling some of Justice Scalia’s 
“memorable” comments); Newman, supra note 122, at 908. 
124. See Senior, supra note 97, and accompanying text. One might wonder whether 
Justice Scalia just pretended not to care. He apparently cared early in his Supreme Court 
career. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 864 
(1989) (anticipating that some of his dissents would eventually prevail). 
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A. Dissenting Discourse as Circuit Judge: 1982–1986 
Judge Scalia spent four years on the D.C. Circuit,125 issuing 
relatively few separate opinions. He occasionally issued a biting 
dissent, but his typical practice as a circuit judge did not reflect 
the reputation he would earn as a Supreme Court Justice for 
writing sarcastic, blistering, and sometimes even bombastic 
dissents. 
A few weeks after joining the bench, Judge Scalia issued 
his first dissent—to an unpublished per curiam opinion.126 His 
aggressive approach hinted at his future dissenting rhetoric. The 
plaintiffs lacked standing, he reasoned, and the majority’s grant 
of injunctive relief was not only misguided but also implicated 
the separation of powers.127 Long-winded and pointedly critical 
of the majority’s reasoning and conclusion,128 Judge Scalia’s 
dissent reflected an acerbic wit.129
In his first full year as a circuit judge, Judge Scalia wrote 
seven separate opinions—six dissents130 and an opinion 
125. President Reagan reportedly first offered the young Scalia a seat on the Seventh 
Circuit, but he turned it down, hoping for an appointment to the more prestigious and 
influential D.C. Circuit. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL, THE LIFE AND 
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 80 (2009).
126. Covelo Indian Cmty. v. Watt, Nos. 82-2377, 82-2417, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 
23138, *37 (Dec. 21, 1982) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Why the opinion was not designated for 
publication is not entirely clear; it appears only on LEXIS.  
127. Id. at *51–*53.  
128. Even when he concurred in the Court’s judgment, Justice Scalia’s minority 
opinions were long. E.g., Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639, 656–74 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, taking eighteen printed pages to critique 
the Court’s death-penalty jurisprudence along the way).
129. The last sentence was perhaps his most biting: “There is no justification in law or 
in practicality for this court to ride to the assistance of an allegedly uninformed and 
impotent Congress which will otherwise not be able, as it wishes, to help these plaintiffs.” 
Covelo, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23138, at *53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
130. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1192–1200 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), rev’d, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Ensign-Bickford Co. v. Occ. Safety & Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 717 F.2d 1419, 1423–24 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steger v. Def. 
Investigative Serv., 717 F.2d 1402, 1407–09 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 
(1984); United States v. Richardson, 702 F.2d 1079, 1086–94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), rev’d, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); KCST-TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 699 F.2d 1185, 1195–
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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concurring in part and dissenting in part.131 While typically 
verbose, they were for the most part temperate in tone and well-
reasoned. Some reflected snippets of the Scalia wit,132 but few 
reflected the vitriolic tone that would become the defining 
characteristic of his opinions on the Supreme Court. And several 
even included self-effacing clauses such as “it seems to me” and 
“in my view,”133 acknowledging that his perspective might not 
be the only correct one. 
But perhaps Judge Scalia was emboldened when three of 
his early dissents, each reflecting a spark of his later aggressive 
tone, prompted Supreme Court reversals.134 In the first case, the 
majority opinion granted double-jeopardy relief in an 
interlocutory appeal. Judge Scalia dissented, warning that the 
panel’s opinion “will bring the criminal law process into greater 
public disrepute than the exclusionary rule, while at the same 
time doing criminal defendants an evident injustice.”135 The 
Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with him on jurisdiction but 
resolving the case on other grounds.136
In the second—a challenge to the use of execution drugs 
that the FDA had not yet approved—Judge Scalia’s tone was 
more strident.137 The plaintiff inmates had unsuccessfully 
petitioned the lower court to compel agency enforcement, and 
the circuit panel granted relief.138 Judge Scalia’s dissent  
131. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1255–59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, 
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev’d, 467 U.S. 340 (1984).  
132. See, e.g., Steger, 717 F.2d at 1407 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I dissent because I 
believe the majority has applied a microscope to an inquiry which Congress meant to be 
conducted with the naked eye.”).
133. E.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 698 F.2d at 1255 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I dissent from 
the Court’s action in reversing the district court’s dismissal of the individual consumers, 
who in my view were correctly found to lack standing.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 
1258 (“I prefer, therefore, to rest my disposition of this aspect of the case upon what seems 
to me surer ground . . . .” (emphasis added)); Richardson, 702 F.2d at 1094 (Scalia,
MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., dissenting) (“In sum, the position adopted by the majority—that a 
double jeopardy right ultimately exists, but a double jeopardy claim may not now be 
asserted—seems to me wrong on both counts.” (emphasis added)).
134. Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1192–1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Watt, 703 F.2d at 622–27 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Richardson, 702 F.2d at 1086–94 (Scalia, MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., 
dissenting).
135. Richardson, 702 F.2d at 1086, 1094 (Scalia, MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., dissenting).
136. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984). 
137. See Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1192–1200 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1192.
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foreshadowed the sarcastic tone of his later Supreme Court 
opinions: “[T]he sound which the majority heard was not an 
anachronistic ring at all,” he wrote, “but the stifled cry of 
smothered stare decisis, or perhaps the far-off shattering of well-
established barriers separating the proper business of the 
executive and judicial branches.”139 The Supreme Court later 
reversed, holding that the agency’s failure to act on the inmates’ 
request was not judicially reviewable.140
The third case involved a permit for a days-long 
demonstration held on National Park Service property where 
camping was prohibited.141 The en banc court held that the 
protestors engaged in expressive conduct by sleeping there in 
makeshift tents to underscore the plight of the homeless, and the 
agency’s regulation violated their First Amendment rights.142
Judge Scalia, joined by two other judges,143 took the position 
that sleeping can never qualify as expressive conduct.144 He 
declared that “to extend . . . protection [to] actions . . . conducted 
for the purpose of ‘making a point’ is to stretch the Constitution 
not only beyond its meaning but beyond reason, and beyond the 
capacity of any legal system to accommodate.”145 The Supreme 
Court later reversed, holding that the regulation was a 
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on the 
demonstrators’ “symbolic conduct,” assuming (without 
deciding) that sleeping can be a form of protected expression.146
In one early opinion, Judge Scalia revealed his capacity for 
aggressive dissenting rhetoric. In Ramirez de Arellano v. 
Weinberger,147 his cutting rhetoric first appeared in a majority 
opinion written over a dissent. The plaintiffs, Honduras property 
owners, sought to enjoin the United States from using their 
139. Id. at 1198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
141. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
142. Watt, 703 F.2d at 599 (Mikva, J., writing for the majority).
143. Id. at 622–27 (Scalia, MacKinnon & Bork, JJ., dissenting).  
144. “That this should seem a bold assertion,” he wrote, “is a commentary upon how far 
judicial and scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed from 
common and common-sense understanding.” Id. at 622. 
145. Id.
146. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294–95.
147. 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated on reh’g, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
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property for military purposes. Judge Scalia, mocking the 
dissent, wrote that they failed to state a claim:
The dissent invokes “the great tradition of judicial 
protection of individual rights against unconstitutional 
governmental activities.” . . . But that tradition has not 
come to us from La Mancha, and does not impel us to right 
the unrightable wrong148 by thrusting the sharpest of our 
judicial lances heedlessly and in perilous directions. It 
acknowledges the need to craft judicial protection in such 
fashion as to preserve the proper functions of 
government.149
On rehearing, the en banc court vacated the panel opinion Judge 
Scalia had written, and he could not resist attacking that decision 
in dissent. “Even if it were the function of the federal courts to 
create a system of shareholder rights for Fifth Amendment 
purposes,” he wrote, “the system the majority has produced is 
either a practical disaster or an analytic monstrosity.”150 And 
then he took one last jab, characterizing the majority as having 
“an inflated notion of the function of this court, which produces 
stirring rhetoric but poor constitutional law.”151 Based on later 
legislative developments, the Supreme Court vacated the en 
banc decision.152
With these few exceptions, the opinions Judge Scalia wrote 
in his first year on the bench were well-reasoned, temperate, and 
judicial in tone.153 And the few separate opinions he issued over 
the next three years generally reflected moderation, although 
some were pointedly critical of the majority’s reasoning,154 and 
148. See JOE DARION & MITCH LEE, The Impossible Dream, on MAN OF LA MANCHA
(Decca 1965) (including the lyric “[t]o right the unrightable wrong”). 
149. Ramirez de Arellano, 724 F.2d at 156 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority). 
150. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en 
banc) (Scalia, Bork & Starr, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 
(1985).
151. Id. at 1565–66 (Scalia, Bork & Starr, JJ., dissenting).
152. See Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano, 471 U.S. 1113, 1113 (1985) (mem.). 
None of the biting Scalia rhetoric had any effect on the outcome. 
153. See Ensign-Bickford Co., 717 F.2d at 1423–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Steger, 717 
F.2d at 1407–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Watt, 703 F.2d at 622–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
KCST-TV, Inc., 699 F.2d at 1195–201 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 698 
F.2d at 1255–59 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
154. See, e.g., Carter, 727 F.2d at 1246 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Assuming . . . that by 
“discriminatory intent” the majority means an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, 
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one criticized the result sought by the plaintiffs as “far too 
speculative to justify the exercise of judicial power.”155
But one 1984 case reflected Judge Scalia’s penchant for 
acrimonious rhetoric. Survivors of those killed in an Antarctica 
airplane crash sued the United States for wrongful death.  
Whether they stated a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
turned on whether Antarctica was a “foreign country.”  The 
panel held that it was not, allowing the claim.156
Judge Scalia’s twenty-five-page dissent began in an 
exasperated tone. He attacked the majority for creating “venue 
and choice-of-law solutions out of whole cloth” by rewriting the 
statute instead of interpreting it.157 He also excoriated the 
majority for relying on “the ever-congenial banquet of 
legislative history (in the case of the FTCA, a banquet with 
separate sittings in a number of years before it was finally 
adopted in 1946).”158 And finally, he offered this biting and 
sarcastic off-the-point aside:
I suppose it must be regarded as fortunate that the 
majority’s decision to replace the choice-of-law rule of the 
statute with those of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws . . . led to the District of Columbia in the present 
case. But one must fear that the circumstances of the next 
Antarctica case (or perhaps a revision of the Restatement)
will lead next time to the substantive law of the Soviet 
this is the most demonstrable illogic.”); see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 749 F.2d at 887 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ([The majority’s] notion of total preemption and cede-back has no 
basis in reality.”); id. at 890 (“The majority has it precisely backwards . . . when . . . it in 
effect applies a standard . . . to reach a conclusion regarding the meaning of the statutory 
text.” (emphasis in original)); id. at 893 (“Legislative compromise (which is to say most 
intelligent legislation) becomes impossible when there is no assurance that the statutory 
words in which it is contained will be honored.”).
155. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d at 1345 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That opinion, 
however, did not criticize the majority’s reasoning, or even the plaintiff’s motives—only 
the result: “What we achieve today is not judicial vindication of private rights, but judicial 
infringement upon the people’s prerogative to have their elected representatives determine 
how [to apply] laws that do not bear upon private rights.” Id. at 1342.
156. Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 105–06 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
157. Id. at 112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
158. Id. at 115. In mocking language, Judge Scalia commended “the wisdom of the 
English courts in refusing to attend these [legislative history] feasts.” Id. It would not be 
long, however, before the English courts decided to partake of the very “feast” of which 
Judge Scalia spoke so disparagingly. See Pepper v. Hart [1992] AC 593 (noting that 
Parliament’s clear statements of purpose when enacting legislation may be consulted to 
guide judicial interpretation). 
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Union. If that happens, one wonders whether the 
consequence will be to convert Antarctica (for purposes of 
that case) into a “foreign country” (since foreign law would 
then be applicable) with the result that the suit will be 
dismissed; or rather to set the court off in search of another 
nonjurisdiction to replace Restatement (Second), which will 
perhaps once again lead to the United States substantive 
law. I am tempted to confess that a decision which 
produces such endlessly interesting ramifications cannot be 
all bad.159
After this long-winded, sarcastic dissent, Judge Scalia’s 
separate opinions were shorter, more temperate, and generally 
more self-effacing. It was almost as if someone had whispered 
in his ear that if he ever hoped to be elevated to the Supreme 
Court, he should consider toning down his discourse to reflect a 
more judicial temperament. 
B. Dissenting Discourse as Supreme Court Justice: 1986–1995 
At his Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Judge Scalia 
was praised for his skill “in the arcane art of cogently drafting 
judicial opinions.”160 One senator quoted an unnamed judge who 
reported that Judge Scalia had a “combination of commitment 
with vigor and an incisive, often wittily sarcastic, . . . style that 
will rally the troops even if it never commands a majority of the 
court.”161
One Senator, noting the frequency with which Supreme 
Court Justices had been issuing separate opinions, expressed 
“concern about the effect of these increasingly sharp public 
disagreements on the collegiality of the Court.” Asked whether 
separate opinions on the Supreme Court had “impeded the 
159. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 130 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
160. Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 29 (Aug. 5–6, 1986), available at https://www.loc.gov/law/find/nominations/scalia/ 
hearing.pdf [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings] (Statement of Senator McConnell).  
161. Id. at 23 (prepared Statement of Senator Denton (ellipsis in original)). Senator 
Denton reported that Judge Scalia was “genuinely liked by his colleagues on the Court, 
whether of liberal or conservative bent, and is very effective at forging coalitions between 
those on all sides of the issue.” Id. Judge Scalia also received the American Bar 
Association’s highest rating of “Well Qualified.” Id. at 113–17 (reproducing ABA letter of 
August 5, 1986). 
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ability of either lawyers or judges to glean the reasoning to 
support a particular decision,”162 Judge Scalia agreed that they 
had. Then, acknowledging that he had not issued a “notable” 
number of separate opinions as a circuit judge, he expressed 
“hope” that he could exercise the self-restraint necessary to keep 
from doing so if confirmed to the Supreme Court.163
Just eight years later, however, Justice Scalia’s separate 
opinions had already earned him a reputation for his “quick 
tongue and acerbic wit,” in some cases having “crossed the line 
between lively language and impermissibly caustic speech.”164
But not all his early dissents fit this description. His first was 
generally respectful in tone—perhaps because two other Justices 
joined it.165 In the most pointed passage, he called it “fanciful”
for the Court to hold that a Connecticut primary statute 
implicated the right of association as between Republican Party 
members and independent voters.166 But otherwise the opinion 
was well-reasoned, temperate, and brief. His second dissent, 
joined only by Justice White, was twice as long as the first,167
but it too was generally temperate and well reasoned.
His third dissent, this time in an affirmative-action case, 
was strikingly different.168 Justice Scalia ratcheted up the 
rhetoric, reaching a degree of snarkiness that foreshadowed the 
tone of many later opinions. He declared two passages in the 
majority opinion “patently false,”169 used language about 
women’s career aspirations that many would find demeaning,170
162. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 160, at 46–47.   
163. Id. at 47. 
164. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10, at 1077.
165. Tashjian v. Repub. Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 234–37 (1986) (Scalia, J., 
Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting). In the same case, Justice Scalia also joined a 
separate dissent authored by Justice Stevens. See id. at 230 (Stevens & Scalia, JJ., 
dissenting).
166. Id. at 235 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting). The word 
“fanciful” appears regularly in Scalia dissents. 
167. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 607–14 (1987) (Scalia & 
White, JJ, dissenting). 
168. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 657–77 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J, dissenting.). 
169. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting); see also id. at 671 
(same).
170. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]here 
are, of course, those who believe that the social attitudes which cause women themselves to 
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denigrated Court precedent,171 denounced an earlier case and 
declared that it should be overruled,172 and ended on a dark note 
of foreboding that warned of the injustices likely to flow from 
the Court’s decision.173 All were characteristic of the disdainful, 
exaggerated tone that would soon become his trademark. 
The eleven dissents Justice Scalia authored during his first 
term ranged from respectful and generally brief174 to vitriolic 
and lengthy.175 In between were sharply—even harshly—
worded dissents that focused on critiquing the Court’s reasoning 
rather than attacking other Justices or undermining precedent.176
His last first-term dissent, however, was full of vituperative 
rhetoric, accusing the Court of distorting the record and the 
precedents, lacking any basis for its holding, engaging in 
misguided reasoning, “boggl[ing] the mind,” making 
“sweeping” assertions that were “contrary to reason and 
experience,” and finally, reaching an “absurd” result.177  Perhaps 
most alarming, this most disrespectful dissent was joined by 
three other Justices whose opinions were typically temperate and 
judicial in tone, as if Justice Scalia’s disrespectful rhetoric were 
beginning to infect the rest of the Court. 
avoid certain jobs and to favor others are as nefarious as conscious, exclusionary 
discrimination,” asserting that “there is assuredly no consensus on the point”). 
171. Id. at 670–71 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting). 
172. Id. at 672–73 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting). 
173. Id. at 675–77 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J., dissenting).  
174. Booth v. Md., 482 U.S. 496, 519–21 (1987) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & 
O’Connor, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 846–50 (1987)
(Scalia, J. dissenting); Gray v. Miss., 481 U.S. 648, 672–80 (1987) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, 
C.J., White & O’Connor, J.J., dissenting); Cal. Coastal, 480 U.S. at 607–14 (Scalia & 
White, JJ., dissenting); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 234–37 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & 
O’Connor, J., dissenting).
175. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394–401 (1987) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., 
White & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Rev., 
483 U.S. 232, 254–65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610–40 (1987) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657–77 (1987) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, 
& White, J., dissenting in part). 
176. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303–06 (1987) (Scalia, J., & 
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692–703 (1987) 
(Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. 
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 235–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
177. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 394–401 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & O’Connor, JJ., 
dissenting).
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The dissents Justice Scalia issued during his first term were 
characteristic of those he would author during his next three 
decades on the Supreme Court, except that he wrote solo 
dissents more frequently over the years.178 And generally 
speaking, his rhetoric became more biting. Many of his dissents 
were well-reasoned, if long-winded, but Justice Scalia often 
could not resist adding vitriol. 
One 1988 dissent, for example, ended this way: 
Today’s decision is a potential cornucopia of waste. Since 
its reasoning cannot possibly be followed where it leads, 
the jurisdiction of the Claims Court has been thrown into 
chaos. On the other hand, perhaps this is the opinion’s 
greatest strength. Since it cannot possibly be followed 
where it leads, the lower courts may have the sense to 
conclude that it leads nowhere, and to limit it to the single 
type of suit before us.179
Another was a thirty-seven-page dissent to an otherwise 
unanimous opinion upholding a statute that authorized 
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate criminal 
allegations against government officials.180 Perhaps its most 
memorable paragraph was about the allocation of power: 
That is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of 
power among Congress, the President, and the courts . . . . 
Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court 
clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing: the potential of the 
asserted principle to effect important change in the 
equilibrium of power is not immediately evident, and must 
178. While he wrote only one solo dissent in his first term, Justice Scalia wrote alone 
more often as the years went on. In his second term, he authored three solo dissents; in his 
third, two; in his fourth, one; and in his fifth, five. In many later terms, it was not unusual 
for five of Justice Scalia’s dissents to be issued solely on his own behalf. In a typical term, 
he wrote an average of ten dissents, although that number declined significantly between 
1993 and 1995. One reason for the decline in those years might have been Justice 
Thomas’s 1991 appointment, replacing Justice Marshall. The Court’s majority then shifted 
to a more conservative perspective. 
179. Bowen v. Mass., 487 U.S. 879, 930 (1988) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
180. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice 
Kennedy took no part in this seven-to-one decision.  
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be discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis. But this 
wolf comes as a wolf.181
Then he lectured his colleagues, accusing them of departing 
from the Constitutional text, announcing the decision without 
analysis, and abandoning “the government of laws that the 
Constitution established,” instituting in its place a scheme that 
“is not a government of laws at all.”182 He ended with 
melodrama, criticizing the majority’s “ad hoc approach” to 
constitutional adjudication that “is guaranteed to produce a 
result, in every case, that will make a majority of the Court 
happy with the law.”183  He preferred to “rely upon the judgment 
of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people 
who approved it, and of two centuries of history that have shown 
it to be sound.”184
Justice Scalia occasionally wrote with startling fervor. In a 
case striking down a statute exempting religious periodicals 
from a state tax, he began his dissent with this jarring rhetoric: 
As a judicial demolition project, today’s decision is 
impressive. The machinery employed by the opinions of 
Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun is no more 
substantial than the antinomy that accommodation of 
religion may be required but not permitted, and the bold but 
unsupportable assertion . . . that government may not 
“convey a message of endorsement of religion.” With this 
frail equipment, the Court topples an exemption for 
religious publications of a sort that expressly appears in the 
laws of at least 15 of the 45 States that have sales and use 
taxes . . . . I dissent because I find no basis in the text of the 
Constitution, the decisions of this Court, or the traditions of 
181. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia later referred to 
his Morrison opinion as “my lonesome dissent.” Scalia, supra note 124, at 851. He also 
called it the “most wrenching” case he had ever decided:  
[I]t was wrenching not only because it came out wrong—I was the sole 
dissenter—but because the opinion was written by Rehnquist, who had been 
head of the Office of Legal Counsel, before me, and who I thought would realize 
the importance of that power of the president to prosecute. And he not only 
wrote the opinion; he wrote it in a manner that was more extreme than I think 
Bill Brennan would have written it. That was wrenching. 
Senior, supra note 97 (quoting Justice Scalia). 
182. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 711–12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Kapgan, supra note 6, at 79 (noting that 
Scalia was “ever the one for drama”). 
184. Id.
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our people for disapproving this longstanding and 
widespread practice.185
And he ended with this equally jarring rhetoric: 
It is not right—it is not constitutionally healthy—that this 
Court should feel authorized to refashion anew our civil 
society’s relationship with religion, adopting a theory of 
church and state that is contradicted by current practice, 
tradition, and even our own case law. I dissent.186
Justice Scalia even attacked Justices who wrote separate 
concurring opinions. Consider, for example, his lengthy and 
otherwise respectful dissent in McKoy v. North Carolina,187 in 
which Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor joined.188 The vitriolic 
footnotes in the dissent were pointedly directed at Justice 
Blackmun and his concurring opinion, the last of them perhaps 
the most strident: 
Justice Blackmun believes that [the Court’s] grotesque 
distortion of normal jury deliberations cannot be blamed 
upon the rule the Court today announces, but is rather 
North Carolina’s own fault, because the scheme it has 
adopted represents “an extraordinary departure from the 
way in which juries customarily operate.” . . . Typically, he 
points out, juries “are . . . called upon to render unanimous 
verdicts on the ultimate issues of a given case,” with “no 
general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the 
preliminary factual issues which underlie the 
verdict.” . . . This is the sort of argument that causes state 
legislators to pull their hair. A general verdict is of course 
the usual practice. But it is this Court that has pushed the 
States to special verdicts in the capital sentencing field. We 
have intimated that requiring “the sentencing authority . . . 
to specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision” 
may be necessary to ensure . . .  “that death sentences are 
not imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner.” Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) . . . . Disparaging a 
practice we have at least encouraged, if not indeed coerced, 
gives new substance to the charge that we have been 
185. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29–30, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, 
C.J., & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 45 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. 494 U.S. 433 (1990). 
188. Id. at 457–71 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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administering a “bait and switch” capital sentencing 
jurisprudence.189
And near the end of an otherwise temperate dissent in Grady v. 
Corbin,190 Justice Scalia dropped these sarcastic comments—all 
aimed at his colleagues—into a nearly two-page paragraph:
There are many questions here, and the answers to all of 
them are ridiculous.  
This delicious role reversal, discovered to have been 
mandated by the Double Jeopardy Clause lo these 200 
years, makes for high comedy but inferior justice.  
If the judge initially decides that the previously prosecuted 
offense “will not be proved” (whatever that means) he will 
have to decide at the conclusion of the trial whether it “has 
been proved” (whatever that means).  
Even if we had no constitutional text and no prior case law 
to rely upon, rejection of today’s opinion is adequately 
supported by the modest desire to protect our criminal legal 
system from ridicule. 
[P]rosecutors confronted with the inscrutability of today’s 
opinion will be well advised to proceed on the assumption 
that the “same transaction” theory has already been 
adopted. It is hard to tell what else has.191
Toward the end of his time on the Court, Justice Scalia did 
much the same thing in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry.192
After writing a generally well-reasoned dissent, he suddenly 
189. Id. at 470 n.5 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
190. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
191. Id. at 542–43 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Similar 
passages appear in other Scalia dissents. See, e.g., Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 
448, 469 (1998) (Scalia, O’Connor & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (referring to “ex post facto
legislative psychoanalysis”); Simmons v. S.C., 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia & 
Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (referring to “a whole new chapter in the ‘death-is-different’ 
jurisprudence which this Court is in the apparently continuous process of composing” and 
the “Federal Rules of Death Penalty Evidence, so to speak, which this Court will 
presumably craft (at great expense to the swiftness and predictability of justice) year by 
year”); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405, 419 (1991) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & 
Kennedy, J., dissenting) (characterizing Court’s approach as “backwards,” its method as 
one that “psychoanalyzes Congress rather than reads its laws,” and its holding as 
“poison[ing] the well of future legislation”); Minnick v. Miss., 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) 
(Scalia, J. & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (referring to “a veritable fairyland castle of 
imagined constitutional restriction”). 
192. ___ U.S.  ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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switched tone as he accused the Court of “announc[ing] a rule 
that is blatantly gerrymandered to the facts,” dismissed one of 
the Court’s conclusions as “[n]onsense,” criticized a step in the 
Court’s analysis as “a leap worthy of the Mad Hatter,” asserted 
that the Court “may as well jump from power over issuing 
declaratory judgments to a monopoly on writing law-review 
articles,” likened the foreign policy facilitated by the Court’s 
decision to “that of a monarchy,” and predicted that the decision 
would “erode the structure of separated powers that the People 
established for the protection of their liberty.”193
In other dissents, Justice Scalia used melodramatic 
language to ridicule the Court’s conclusion that a system of 
political patronage could infringe on First Amendment rights,194
to contest its approval of closed-circuit testimony by child 
victims of alleged abuse,195 to belittle the Court’s concerns about 
unconstitutional racial discrimination in prosecutors’ 
peremptory strikes,196 to criticize the Court’s conclusions in a 
search-and-seizure case,197 and to warn about the “destruction of 
predictability” stemming from the Court’s interpretation of a 
lien provision in the Bankruptcy Code. 198
Justice Scalia was prone to exaggeration as well as 
melodramatic vitriol. In one case he accused the Court of 
193. Id. at 2121, 2123 (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J., & Alito, J., dissenting). 
194. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., 
& Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of making “its constitutional civil 
service reform absolute”).
195. Md. v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., 
dissenting) (expressing worry about “subordination of explicit constitutional text to 
currently favored public policy”).
196. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 426–31 (1991) (Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Morgan v. Ill., 504 U.S. 719, 748–49, 752 (1992) (Scalia & Thomas, 
JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing Court’s reasoning in a jury-selection case as 
failing to pass “the most gullible scrutiny” and as making “a great leap over an 
unbridgeable chasm of logic,” concluding that its holding was “grossly” offensive to the 
Constitution).
197. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested may be compelled to await the grace 
of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine, as it churns its cycle for up to two days—never once 
given the opportunity to show a judge that there is absolutely no reason to hold him, that a 
mistake has been made.”).  
198. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing 
Court of “disregarding well-established and oft-repeated principles” and rendering them 
“less secure and the certainty they are designed to achieve less attainable”).
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creating “a vast uncertainty in the law,” bound to yield a future 
in which “the lawfulness and finality of no conviction or 
sentence can be assured.”199 In a second, he challenged the 
Court’s “revolutionary new doctrine of standing that will permit 
the entire body of public civil penalties to be handed over to 
enforcement by private interests.”200 In another he predicted 
“years of litigation-driven confusion and destabilization” and 
“judicially ordained turmoil” caused by the Court’s 
“inscrutable” reasoning.201
A particularly striking example of Justice Scalia’s 
disrespect for his judicial colleagues appeared in Lee v. 
Weisman,202 an Establishment Clause case involving clergy 
members invited to offer nonsectarian prayers at a public-school 
graduation.203 Excerpts from his fifteen-page dissent are packed 
with examples of his most inappropriate rhetoric:  
In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits 
invocations and benedictions at public-school graduation 
ceremonies, the Court . . . lays waste a tradition that is as 
old as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves 
. . . . As its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its 
social engineering, the Court invents a boundless, and 
boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion 
. . . . Today’s opinion shows . . . why our Nation’s 
protection, that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot 
possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical 
predilections of the Justices of this Court . . . . 
. . . . . 
The Court presumably would separate graduation 
invocations and benedictions from other instances of public 
“preservation and transmission of religious beliefs” on the 
ground that they involve “psychological coercion.” I find it 
a sufficient embarrassment that our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence regarding holiday displays . . . has come to 
199. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 133 (1991) (Scalia, White & Souter, JJ., & 
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
200. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 209 
(2000) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
201. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 749, 751 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and 
dissenting).
202. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
203. Id. at 586 (Kennedy, J., writing for the Court). 
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“requir[e] scrutiny more commonly associated with interior 
decorators than with the judiciary.” . . . But interior 
decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology 
practiced by amateurs. . . . [T]he Court has gone beyond the 
realm where judges know what they are doing. The Court’s 
argument that state officials have “coerced” students to take 
part in the invocation and benediction at graduation 
ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent. 
. . . . . 
The Court . . . does not say . . . that students are 
psychologically coerced to bow their heads, place their 
hands in a Dürer-like prayer position, pay attention to the 
prayers, utter “Amen,” or in fact pray. (Perhaps further 
intensive psychological research remains to be done on 
these matters.) 
. . . . . 
I see no warrant for expanding the concept of coercion 
beyond acts backed by threat of penalty—a brand of 
coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us 
who have made a career of reading the disciples of 
Blackstone rather than of Freud. 
. . . . . 
The Court relies on our “school prayer” cases. . . . But 
whatever the merit of those cases, they do not support, 
much less compel, the Court’s psycho-journey. 
. . . . . 
Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled 
(so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are 
not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-
accepted constitutional traditions. Foremost among these 
has been the so-called Lemon test . . . . Unfortunately, 
however, the Court has replaced Lemon with its psycho-
coercion test, which suffers the double disability of having 
no roots whatever in our people’s historic practice, and 
being as infinitely expandable as the reasons for 
psychotherapy itself. 
. . . . . 
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if 
religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some 
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purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in 
secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s room. For 
most believers it is not that, and has never been.204
Beyond their disrespectful rhetoric, exaggeration, and 
melodrama, Scalia’s separate opinions were characteristically 
verbose. He once added a twelve-page dissent in a case that even 
he admitted was unimportant.205 Nevertheless, he took it upon 
himself to lecture the majority for its errant methodology, 
bluntly declaring it “an act of willpower rather than of 
judgment.”206 He declared each part of the Court’s two-step 
interpretive analysis “patently false”;207 criticized the majority 
for failing to consult one of his favored dictionaries to interpret a 
term’s “ordinary meaning,” instead relying on “fictitious” 
dictionary support;208 and scolded it for “equat[ing] parole and 
supervised release.”209 Then he moved on to a jurisprudence 
lesson:
[A]n institution that is careless in small things is more 
likely to be careless in large ones; and an institution that is 
willful in small things is almost certain to be willful in 
large ones. The fact that nothing but the Court’s views of 
policy and “congressional purpose” supports today’s 
judgment is a matter of great concern, if only because of 
what it tells district and circuit judges. The overwhelming 
majority of the Courts of Appeals . . . reached the result 
unambiguously demanded by the statutory text. . . . 
Today’s decision invites them to return to headier days of 
not-too-yore, when laws meant what judges knew they 
ought to mean.210
204. Id. at 632–45 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting 
(emphasis in original)). 
205. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This is not an important case, 
since it deals with the interpretation of a statute that has been amended to eliminate, for the 
future, the issue we today resolve.”). 
206. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 722 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do 
not contend that the result the Court reaches is any way remarkable, only that it is not the 
result called for by the statute.”).
207. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
208. Id. at 717, 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
209. Id. at 725 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
210. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even on the rare occasions when Justice Scalia 
wrote a concise dissent, he used negative rhetoric. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 
40, 54 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (scolding Court for using a “recently invented 
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Although the single dissent he authored in 1993 was 
respectful, clear, and concise,211 Justice Scalia reverted to form 
in 1994, writing an extraordinarily sarcastic dissent in a 
paternity case challenging the use of peremptory strikes to 
remove women from the jury: 
Today’s opinion is an inspiring demonstration of how 
thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in 
matters pertaining to the sexes (or as the Court would have 
it, the genders), and how sternly we disapprove the male 
chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors. The price to be 
paid for this display—a modest price, surely—is that most 
of the opinion is quite irrelevant to the case at hand. . . . 
[T]he Court treats itself to an extended discussion of the 
historic exclusion of women not only from jury service, but 
also from service at the bar (which is rather like jury 
service, in that it involves going to the courthouse a lot). 
. . . . . 
Perhaps, however . . ., only the stereotyping of groups 
entitled to heightened or strict scrutiny constitutes “the very 
stereotype the law condemns”—so that other stereotyping 
(e.g., wide-eyed blondes and football players are dumb) 
remains OK. 
. . . . . 
In order . . . to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality of 
the sexes, the Court imperils a practice that has been 
considered an essential part of fair jury trial since the dawn 
of the common law. The Constitution of the United States 
neither requires nor permits this vandalizing of our people’s 
traditions.212
Justice Scalia’s dissent in a 1994 Establishment Clause case 
challenging New York school district boundaries is remarkable 
requirement” that yielded “a propensity to error that make a scandal and a mockery of the 
capital sentencing process”).  
211. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241–47 (1993) (Scalia, Stevens & Souter, 
JJ., dissenting). In addition to the Smith dissent, Justice Scalia wrote a 1993 opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 714–24 
(1993) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also joined 
dissenting and concurring opinions by other Justices. 
212. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156–57, 161, 163 (1994) (Scalia & 
Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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not only for its extreme sarcasm, but also for its insulting attacks 
on fellow Justices and their separately expressed points of view, 
repeatedly singling them out by name. The first paragraph is 
instantly off-putting: 
The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in 
Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the 
Satmar Hasidim. I do not know who would be more 
surprised at this discovery: the Founders of our Nation or 
Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum, founder of the Satmar. The 
Grand Rebbe would be astounded to learn that after 
escaping brutal persecution and coming to America with 
the modest hope of religious toleration for their ascetic 
form of Judaism, the Satmar had become so powerful, so 
closely allied with Mammon, as to have become an 
“establishment” of the Empire State. And the Founding 
Fathers would be astonished to find that the Establishment 
Clause . . . has been employed to prohibit characteristically 
and admirably American accommodation of the religious 
practices (or more precisely, cultural peculiarities) of a tiny 
minority sect. I, however, am not surprised. Once this 
Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing 
prevents it from calling religious toleration the 
establishment of religion.213
Justice Scalia then characterized the Court’s opinion and 
reasoning as “misdescrib[ing]” precedent,214 “mislead[ing],”215
“astounding,”216 “astonishing[]” and “breathtaking,”217
“disfavoring of religion,”218 and “steamrolling . . . the difference 
between civil authority held by a church and civil authority held 
by members of a church.”219  He declared that the Court’s 
analysis “could scarcely be weaker”220 and failed to “give the 
213. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994) 
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original).
214. Id. at 734 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
215. Id. at 751 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
216. Id.at 752 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
217. Id. at 735 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
218. Id. at 736 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
219. Id. at 735 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
220. Id. at 738 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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New York Legislature the benefit of the doubt.”221 He thought 
the opinion was “preposterous,”222 pernicious,”223 “not a rational 
argument,”224 and based on “the flimsiest of evidence.”225 This
was aggressive rhetoric, but Justice Scalia’s watershed year on 
the Court was yet to come. 
C. Dissenting Discourse as Supreme Court Justice: 1996–2016 
Nearly all of Justice Scalia’s twelve 1996 dissents bore the 
angry tone of someone who had expected to prevail, but was 
unable to muster the votes to write for the majority.226 This 
pattern continued through the next two decades of his dissenting 
rhetoric,227 as might be best illustrated by the saga that began in 
1996 and concluded with Obergefell v. Hodges228 in 2015.
The story begins with Romer v. Evans,229 in which the 
Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment 
preempting state or local laws protecting homosexuals against 
221. Id. at 740 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
222. Id. at 735 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
223. Id. at 737 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
224. Id. at 741 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
225. Id. at 752 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  He went on to 
criticize Justice Stevens for writing “less a legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism” 
that “announces a positive hostility to religion,” id. at 749; Justice Kennedy for using 
analysis that “founder[s] on its own terms,” id.; and Justice O’Connor for proposing no 
replacement for the Lemon test so the Court would “no longer feel the need to even pretend 
that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any principle,” 
id. at 751 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
226. Ironically, the only respectful dissent that Justice Scalia filed in 1996 was one that 
he wrote only for himself. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700–05 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
227. It is only fair to point out that Justice Scalia occasionally issued respectful 
dissents, even in this period. E.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 
2479 (2015) (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). The Kingsley majority held 
that a pretrial detainee could support an excessive-force claim by showing that “objectively 
unreasonable” force had been used. Id. at 2473 (Breyer, J.).  While Justice Scalia’s dissent 
suggested that this conclusion rested on an “illogical” premise, it was otherwise respectful 
and temperate. Id. at 2478 (Scalia, J., Roberts, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). But Scalia 
dissents of this type became increasingly rare beginning in 1996. 
228. ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Many other Scalia dissents would illustrate 
the disturbing decline of this brilliant jurist’s discourse and his increasingly frequent 
outbursts of frustration with the Court. But the Romer-to-Obergefell series makes the point.  
229. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 67 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 67 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
242 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
discrimination.230 Justice Scalia’s excoriating dissent began this 
way: “The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of 
spite.”231  With characteristic prescience, he noted the apparent 
conflict between Romer and Bowers v. Hardwick,232 decided a 
decade earlier, which had upheld the constitutionality of a state 
statute criminalizing sodomy.233 He accused the Romer majority 
of placing the Court’s prestige behind the proposition that 
opposing homosexuality was “as reprehensible as racial or 
religious bias.”234 And he proclaimed that the Court had “no 
business” imposing the elite values of its members—including 
the belief that “animosity” toward homosexuals is “evil”—on all 
Americans.235
Justice Scalia continued with spleen-venting outrage, 
claiming that “[t]he Court’s portrayal of Coloradans as a society 
fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled ‘gay-bashing’” was “so 
false as to be comical.”236 He called the holding that the 
Colorado amendment violated the federal Constitution “a 
facially absurd proposition” that “frustrate[d] Colorado’s 
reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral 
values.”237 And he accused the Court of inventing “a novel and 
extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from 
traditional forces” and of “verbally disparag[ing] as bigotry 
adherence to traditional attitudes,”238 which was “nothing short 
of insulting.”239 Finally, he called the decision an act “not of 
judicial judgment, but of political will.”240
As Justice Scalia predicted, the Court overruled Bowers
seven years later in Lawrence v. Texas,241 a challenge to an anti-
sodomy statute. Justice Scalia opened by feigning surprise that 
230. Id. at 624 (quoting 1992 amendment to Colorado Constitution). 
231. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
232. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (five-to-four decision), overruled by Lawrence v. Tex., 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). 
233. Id. at 196. 
234. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).  
235. Id.
236. Id. at 645 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
237. Id. at 647, 651 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
238. Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
239. Id.
240. Id. at 653 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
241. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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the Court had overruled Bowers, “rendered a mere 17 years 
ago.”242 His first few paragraphs chastised the Court for 
invoking stare decisis a decade earlier243 when refusing to 
overrule Roe v. Wade244 and its “preservation of judicially 
invented abortion rights,”245 while appearing to have no 
compunction about overruling Bowers.246 Justice Scalia devoted 
five pages to defending Bowers while chiding the majority for 
selectively disregarding stare decisis.247 With characteristic 
slippery-slope exaggeration, he claimed that overruling Bowers
would effect a social catastrophe. 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, 
and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light 
of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. 
Every single one of these laws is called into question by 
today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the 
scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding. . . . 
What a massive disruption of the current social 
order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails.248
But then Justice Scalia conceded that he was not at all 
surprised by the Court’s reasoning.249 He pointed out that the 
Court had sidestepped the question whether homosexual sodomy 
was a fundamental right, and had effectively conceded it was not 
by applying the rational basis test.250 Next, he challenged the 
majority’s reasoning that consensual homosexual relations 
qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty interest based on 
an “emerging awareness” of a right to privacy with respect to 
adult sexual activity.251 Then he refuted the majority’s reasoning 
242. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
243. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
244. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Casey, 539 U.S. at 853–60 (explaining considerations 
against overruling Roe).
245. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
246. Id. at 586–87 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
247. See id. at 586–92 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
248. Id. at 590–91 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
249. Id. at 592 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t does not 
surprise me . . . that the Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis set 
forth in Casey. It has thereby exposed Casey’s extraordinary deference to precedent for the 
result-oriented expedient that it is.”). 
250. See id. at 593–94 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).  
251. Id. at 597–98 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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that Texas had no rational basis for singling out sodomy for 
criminal penalties.252 “This proposition,” he wrote, “is so out of 
accord with our jurisprudence—indeed, with the jurisprudence 
of any society we know—that it requires little discussion,” and 
he went on to explain the consequences of the Court’s error:  
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of 
its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 
“immoral and unacceptable,” . . . the same interest 
furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, 
adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity. Bowers
held that this was a legitimate state interest. The Court 
today reaches the opposite conclusion. . . . This effectively 
decrees the end of all morals legislation.253
He accused the Court of signing on to “the so-called homosexual 
agenda,”254 and then warned of the coming apocalypse: 
Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional 
law that has permitted a distinction to be made between 
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal 
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral 
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate 
state interest” for purposes of proscribing that conduct, . . . 
and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of 
neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in 
intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be 
but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring,” . . . what justification could there possibly be for 
denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples 
exercising “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution”? . . . 
This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual 
marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and 
logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. 
Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, 
this is so.255
It would be a decade before Justice Scalia’s predicted 
apocalypse threatened again in United States v. Windsor,256
252. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
253. Id.
254. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
255. Id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
256. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
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which challenged the Defense of Marriage Act.257 After the 
Obama Administration’s Department of Justice declined to 
defend the statute’s constitutionality, a group representing 
Congress was permitted to intervene as an interested party.258
The Court held DOMA unconstitutional because its primary 
purpose and effect were to treat a subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages unequally.259
Justice Scalia dissented, his first paragraph setting the 
derisive tone for the rest of his opinion:
This case is about power in several respects. It is about the 
power of our people to govern themselves, and the power 
of this Court to pronounce the law. Today’s opinion 
aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable consequence of 
diminishing the former. We have no power to decide this 
case. And even if we did, we have no power under the 
Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted 
legislation. The Court’s errors on both points spring forth 
from the same diseased root: an exalted conception of the 
role of this institution in America.260
Then, before reaching the merits, he characterized the Court’s 
taking the case as “an assertion of judicial supremacy” that 
“envisions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the 
apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional 
questions, always and everywhere ‘primary’ in its role.”261 He 
called the case “a contrivance,”262  while deriding as 
“incomprehensible” the Court’s conclusion that adversarial 
aspects of Article III standing are “prudential” rather than 
mandatory.263
But he did not stop there. He mocked the Court’s reasoning 
as “wryly amusing,” and sarcastically asserted that “[r]elegating 
a jurisdictional requirement to ‘prudential’ status is a wondrous 
257. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (defining “marriage” as “only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife,” and “spouse” as “only . . . a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife”).  
258. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 754 (noting that the trial court, without opposition, had 
granted permissive intervention to the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group).  
259. Id. at 769–75. 
260. Id. at 778 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
261. Id. at 779 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
262. Id. at 782 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
263. Id. at 784 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 69 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
246 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
device, enabling courts to ignore the requirement whenever they 
believe it ‘prudent’—which is to say, a good idea.” And he 
denigrated the Court’s cited authorities as falling “miles short of 
supporting the counterintuitive notion that an Article III 
‘controversy’ can exist without disagreement between the 
parties.”264
Justice Scalia was so incensed and exasperated about the 
jurisdictional implications that he was ready to incite a 
constitutional showdown by which Congress might compel the 
Executive Branch to comply with its will by defending DOMA: 
[I]f Congress cannot invoke our authority . . . then its only 
recourse is to confront the President directly. Unimaginable 
evil this is not. Our system is designed for 
confrontation. . . . If majorities in both Houses of Congress 
care enough about the matter, they have available 
innumerable ways to compel executive action without a 
lawsuit—from refusing to confirm Presidential appointees 
to the elimination of funding. (Nothing says “enforce the 
Act” quite like “. . . or you will have money for little else.”) 
But the condition is crucial; Congress must care enough to 
act against the President itself, not merely enough to 
instruct its lawyers to ask us to do so. Placing the 
Constitution’s entirely anticipated political arm wrestling 
into permanent judicial receivership does not do the system 
a favor. And by the way, if the President loses the lawsuit 
but does not faithfully implement the Court’s decree, just as 
he did not faithfully implement Congress’s statute, what 
then? Only Congress can bring him to heel by . . . what do 
you think? Yes: a direct confrontation with the 
President.265
Justice Scalia’s tone was no less biting when he turned to 
the merits.266 He called the Court’s justification for its holding 
“rootless and shifting,”267 accusing the majority of invoking the 
“dread words ‘substantive due process’” as the basis for its 
decision without expressly saying so.268 And then he criticized 
the Court for making “only passing mention” of the arguments 
264. Id. at 785 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
265. Id. at 790–91 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
266. Id. at 791 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
267. Id.
268. Id. at 794 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).  
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advanced by DOMA’s defenders, perhaps, he imagined, 
“because it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s 
supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob 
when one first describes their views as they see them.”269
Justice Scalia enumerated the Court’s specific words used 
to describe the perceived motives of DOMA’s supporters, and 
he declared (without further explanation) that he was “sure these 
accusations [were] quite untrue.”270 He asserted that to defend 
“traditional marriage” is not to demean those “who would prefer 
other arrangements.”271 And then, in an abundance of irony 
considering the habitual tone of his own separate opinions, he let 
loose this remarkably hostile statement:
To hurl such accusations so casually demeans this
institution. In the majority’s judgment, any resistance to its 
holding is beyond the pale of reasoned disagreement. To 
question its high-handed invalidation of a presumptively 
valid statute is to act (the majority is sure) with the 
purpose to “disparage,” “injure,” “degrade,” “demean,” and 
“humiliate” our fellow human beings, our fellow citizens, 
who are homosexual. All that, simply for supporting an Act 
that did no more than codify an aspect of marriage that had 
been unquestioned in our society for most of its 
existence—indeed, had been unquestioned in virtually all 
societies for virtually all of human history. It is one thing 
for a society to elect change; it is another for a court of law 
to impose change by adjudging those who oppose it hostes
humani generis, enemies of the human race.272
But he was not quite done. He warned readers not to be 
fooled by the majority’s “naked declaration” confining its 
holding to same-sex couples who were already lawfully married 
under state law. “It takes real cheek,” he wrote,
for today’s majority to assure us, as it is going out the door, 
that a constitutional requirement to give formal recognition 
to same-sex marriage is not at issue here—when what has 
preceded that assurance is a lecture on how superior the 
majority’s moral judgment in favor of same-sex marriage is 
to the Congress’s hateful moral judgment against it. I 
269. Id. at 796 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
270. Id. at 797 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
271. Id.
272. Id. at 797–98 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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promise you this: The only thing that will “confine” the 
Court’s holding is its sense of what it can get away with.273
Justice Scalia then issued his own string of insults to describe 
the Court’s opinion: He claimed it was based on “scatter-shot 
rationales . . . (federalism noises among them),” complete with 
“disappearing trail[s] of . . . legalistic argle-bargle.”274 He 
thought it “inevitable” that the Court would soon apply its 
holding to invalidate state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, 
and even offered edited paragraphs of the majority’s opinion 
(complete with striketype and italics) to demonstrate how easily 
the Court could do just that.275 He speculated that the Court had 
written these and many more passages to be “deliberately 
transposable” to an opinion that would strike down state statutes 
precluding recognition of same-sex marriages.276 “By formally 
declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of 
human decency,” he claimed, “the majority arms well every 
challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional 
definition.”277 And he predicted that “[t]he result will be a 
judicial distortion of our society’s debate over marriage—a 
debate that can seem in need of our clumsy ‘help’ only to a 
member of this institution.”278 In the end, he conceded that the 
issue was contentious, implicating complicated social and 
political views on a “fundamental” matter, but he believed the 
Court’s opinion “cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an 
honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair 
defeat.”279
Finally came Obergefell. This time the issue of whether 
states could constitutionally refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages was squarely before the Court, as Justice Scalia had 
been predicting since 2003. Justice Kennedy, who had written 
the majority opinions in Lawrence and Windsor, once again 
273. Id. at 798 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
274. Id. at 799 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
275. Id. at 799–800 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
276. Id. at 800 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
277. Id.
278. Id. at 800-01 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
279. Id. at 802 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
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wrote for the Court, holding that states were constitutionally 
barred from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages.280
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent, but 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each dissented separately.281
Justice Scalia’s “blistering dissent”282 reflected his I-told-you-so 
mood,283 declaring the Court’s decision “a threat to American 
democracy.”284 As far as he was concerned, the answer to the 
question before the Court was easy from the perspective of his 
originalist constitutional jurisprudence.285 But Justice Scalia did 
not stop after setting out this simple approach. Instead, he 
mocked the Court’s suggestion that the freedom to marry 
protects other freedoms as well, including those of intimacy, 
expression, and spirituality. He expressed astonishment at “the 
hubris reflected in today’s judicial Putsch.”286 Then, 
demonstrating his outright disgust with the majority’s reasoning, 
he quoted from the Court’s opinion. He even injected meta-
thinking parentheticals into his dissent—as if they were bubble 
thoughts in a comic strip: 
280. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05. 
281. The four dissents span thirty-two pages. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–43. 
Ironically, Chief Justice Roberts has repeatedly expressed his belief that the Court should 
avoid splintered decisions. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Says He Backs 
Consensus, Even If It Means Putting Off Issues for A Later Day, ABA J. DAILY NEWS
(May 26, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_says_he_backs_ 
consensus_even_if_it_means_putting_off_issues_f; Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, ATL.
(Jan.–Feb. 2007), https://www.the atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-rules/3 
05559/.
282. Cf. Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Ready for Prime Time—Group Dynamics, Dissent 
and Intrigue: A Look at the Supreme Court, 1999–2000, 60 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 19 
(Aug./Sept. 2000) (referring to Scalia’s earlier “blistering dissent (does he write any other 
kind?)” in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 461 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
Justice Scalia’s Obergefell dissent was certainly blistering in tone. See, e.g., Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The [majority] opinion is couched in a style that 
is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.”).  
283. Justice Scalia himself used this phrase in his dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000), in which the Court struck down a Nebraska statute banning an 
abortion procedure. Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
284. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
285. Id. at 2628 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (noting that “[w]hen the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State limited marriage to one man and one 
woman,” and asserting that the Court had “no basis for striking down a practice that is not 
expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s text”). 
286. Id. at 2629 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting 
opinions to contain extravagances, even silly 
extravagances, of thought and expression; it is something 
else for the official opinion of the Court to do so. Of course 
the opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly 
incoherent. “The nature of marriage is that, through its 
enduring bond, two persons together can find other 
freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.” (Really? Who ever thought that intimacy and 
spirituality [whatever that means] were freedoms? And if 
intimacy is, one would think Freedom of Intimacy is 
abridged rather than expanded by marriage. Ask the nearest 
hippie. Expression, sure enough, is a freedom, but anyone 
in a long-lasting marriage will attest that that happy state 
constricts, rather than expands, what one can prudently 
say.) Rights, we are told, can “rise . . . from a better 
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives 
define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.” (Huh? 
How can a better informed understanding of how 
constitutional imperatives [whatever that means] define 
[whatever that means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give 
birth to a right?) And we are told that, “[i]n any particular 
case,” either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause 
“may be thought to capture the essence of [a] right in a 
more accurate and comprehensive way,” than the other, 
“even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification 
and definition of the right.” (What say? What possible 
“essence” does substantive due process “capture” in an 
“accurate and comprehensive way”? It stands for nothing 
whatever, except those freedoms and entitlements that this 
Court really likes. And the Equal Protection Clause, as 
employed today, identifies nothing except a difference in 
treatment that this Court really dislikes. Hardly a distillation 
of essence. If the opinion is correct that the two clauses 
“converge in the identification and definition of [a] right,” 
that is only because the majority’s likes and dislikes are 
predictably compatible.) I could go on. The world does not 
expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational pop-
philosophy; it demands them in the law. The stuff 
contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s 
reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.287
287. Id. at 2630 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes omitted; parentheses, 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 72 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 72 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT 251
To many, this was perhaps the most offensive passage in Justice 
Scalia’s extraordinarily offensive dissent.288
But Justice Scalia did not stop there. In a footnote, he 
leveled an unusually pointed, sarcastic attack on the Court’s 
reasoning:
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined 
an opinion for the Court that began: “The Constitution 
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that 
includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a 
lawful realm, to define and express their identity,” I would 
hide my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has descended from the disciplined legal reasoning 
of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical 
aphorisms of the fortune cookie.289
And in characteristic fashion, Justice Scalia felt compelled to 
leave the reader with a ringing, memorable, and quotable phrase:
With each decision of ours that takes from the People a 
question properly left to them—with each decision that is 
unabashedly based not on law, but on the “reasoned 
judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we move one 
step closer to being reminded of our impotence.290
Of course, Justice Scalia could not have known that his 
Obergefell dissent would be among the last of his injudicious 
dissents. But we know that now. Regrettably, his many 
descendants will someday look through the United States 
Reports and read the intemperate words written by their 
ancestor.291 What will they think of his legacy? 
III. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENTS
The voice of the majority may be that of force triumphant, 
content with the plaudits of the hour, and recking little of 
ellipses, brackets, and emphasis in original). 
288. See, e.g., Eric Levitz, Five Unexpected Arguments in Scalia’s Same-Sex Marriage 
Dissent, MSNBC.COM (June 26, 2015 5:00 PM EDT), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/five-
unexpected-arguments-scalias-dissent (describing dissent as “brimming with vitriolic 
snark” and responding to its analysis).  
289. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 n.22 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2631 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
291. Justice Scalia had nine children and often joked in interviews that he had lost track 
of how many grandchildren he had.  
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the morrow. The dissenter speaks to the future, and his 
voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the 
years.292
A. The Law Without Justice Scalia 
The extent of Justice Scalia’s influence will not be known 
for generations,293 although some already predict that “the 
enduring form” of his written opinions offers “the potential to 
shape doctrines and decisions in the near and distant future.”294
The Justice himself once confessed his hope that “at least some” 
of his dissents would someday become majority opinions.295 Yet 
years later, he professed to care little about his legacy.296
Justice Ginsburg recently observed that the Supreme Court 
has changed since Justice Scalia’s death, reporting that “the 
Court is a paler place without our lively Justice Scalia.”297 Even 
Justice Stevens, who often disagreed with Justice Scalia on 
constitutional issues, remembered him for his friendship and 
spontaneous sense of humor.298 Others found him engaging and 
personable,299 sometimes even “charming and . . . riotously 
292. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 36 (1931).
293. E.g., SCALIA’S COURT: A LEGACY OF LANDMARK OPINIONS AND DISSENTS 19 
(Keven A. Ring ed., 2016). 
294. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
295. Scalia, supra note 124, at 864. 
296. Senior, supra note 97 (“But I have never been custodian of my legacy. When I’m 
dead and gone, I’ll either be sublimely happy or terribly unhappy.”). Asked which of his 
decisions he thought posterity would view as “heroic,” Justice Scalia responded, “Oh, my 
goodness. I have no idea. You know, for all I know, 50 years from now I may be the 
Justice Sutherland of the late-twentieth and early-21st century, who’s regarded as: ‘He was 
on the losing side of everything, an old fogey, the old view.’ And I don’t care.” Id.
297. Ginsburg Conversation, supra note 29, at 1499.
298. John Paul Stevens, J., Sup. Ct. of the U.S. (ret.), Some Thoughts About a Former 
Colleague at 2–3 (Apr. 25, 2016), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
speeches/JPS%20Speech%20Washington%20University%20in%20St%20Louis%20Schoo
l%20of%20Law_04-25-2016.pdf. Justice Stevens noted then that “Nino’s friendship with 
his colleagues, including both those who disagreed with his views and those who more 
regularly shared his views, is legendary.” Id. at 3.  
299. E.g., John G. Browning, The Justice Scalia I Knew, 79 TEX. B.J. 294, 294 (2016). 
(characterizing the private Scalia as “a witty, engaging person with the courtly manners of 
an Old World gentleman and a singular devotion to his large family”).  
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funny.”300 But how have his separate opinions influenced and 
shaped the law?301
While Justice Scalia’s dissents were frequently cited for 
their colorful rhetoric, especially in the popular press,302 the very 
fact that they were dissents demonstrates that he often fell short 
of persuading his colleagues to accept his reasoning.303 During 
his lifetime, a majority of the Court would embrace only a 
handful of the hundreds of dissenting opinions the Justice 
personally authored.304 And while Justice Scalia claimed to 
write his dissents for “law students,”305 that begs the question of 
their lasting value as instruments of persuasion. 
300. Dahlia Lithwick, Justice Grover Versus Justice Oscar: Scalia and Breyer Sell 
Very Different Constitutional Worldviews, SLATE (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/12/justice_grover_versus_justice_oscar.html. 
Lithwick analogized Justice Breyer to a “jurisprudential Grover—sweet and optimistic and 
eager-to-please— . . . confident he’ll sell us on his constitutional theory, one lawyer at a 
time. And Antonin Scalia’s constitutional Oscar the Grouch—frustrated and 
misunderstood, yet somehow more lovable for it—doesn’t even try to close the deal. He 
doesn’t need us to vindicate him. He’s confident history will do that.” Id.
301. The following analysis uses the categorization of Scalia opinions by Cornell’s 
Legal Information Institute. See Writings by Justice Scalia Grouped by Type, LII.COM,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/scalia.dec.html (reporting 338 majority and 
plurality opinions, 385 concurring opinions, 270 dissents, and forty-eight opinions 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, for a total of 1,041). 
302. E.g., Michael S. Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia’s Sermonette, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 863, 863 (1997) (referring to “flamboyant judicial rhetoric and colorful 
writing” that “make headlines” and terming Scalia “the master of the eminently quotable 
turn-of-phrase, the arresting quip, the provocatively expressed legal argument”).
303. Kapgan, supra note 6, at 97. 
304. The author’s independent analysis reveals that only six of the many dissents 
Justice Scalia personally authored eventually commanded a majority during his lifetime. 
See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), overruled by Johnson v. United States, ___ 
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Scalia, J.); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), 
overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551; Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled 
by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (Scalia, J.); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010); S.C. v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tenn., 
501 U.S. 808 (1991); Booth v. Md., 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. 
808. In none of the six overruled cases was Justice Scalia the lone dissenter. And four were 
overruled in the same two opinions, reducing the issues on which his dissenting opinions 
have yet prevailed to just four. (The research and analysis supporting the conclusions 
reported in this note are on file with the author.)   
305. Lithwick, supra note 300 (reporting that Justice Scalia “writes his dissents for the 
case books,” and concluding that, while it might be too late to convince lawyers, “he’s still 
hoping to win over the law students”); Senior, supra note 97 (reporting that Justice Scalia 
wrote for law students because “they will read dissents that are breezy and have some 
thrust to them”); see Scalia, supra note 5, at 39 (“In our law schools, it is not necessary to 
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The frequency of Justice Scalia’s dissents306 demonstrates 
his reluctance to follow—or perhaps failure to appreciate—
Justice Brennan’s all-important “Rule of Five.”307 Indeed, 
“persuading his colleagues [was] not . . . one of Scalia’s 
strengths—or even an objective with which his style seem[ed] 
concerned.”308 What, then, does he leave behind? 
B. Justice Scalia’s Judicial Perspectives 
Beyond his love of the battle in judicial decisionmaking 
and his use of sarcasm and scorn as rhetorical aids, Justice 
Scalia was well known for four judicial perspectives. He was a 
constitutional originalist. He was a statutory textualist who 
objected to the use of legislative history as an aid to resolving 
statutory ambiguities. But he regularly consulted dictionaries 
when interpreting statutory language. And he was generally a 
strong proponent of judicial deference to agency interpretation. 
In each of these areas, Justice Scalia’s speeches, books, articles, 
and opinions shaped the law by influencing the philosophies that 
courts draw upon, even though the bulk of his dissents have 
failed to carry the day. 
assign students the writings of prominent academics [to explain] the principal controversies 
of legal method or of constitutional law. Those controversies appear in the opposing 
opinions of the Supreme Court itself, and can be studied from that text.”). 
306. The only other member of the Court to write more dissents than Justice Scalia was 
Justice Stevens, who was well known as a prolific writer. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Dissenter: Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2007), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html (noting that Justice Stevens “files more 
dissents and separate opinions than any of his colleagues”). 
307. Justice Brennan “famously used to tell his law clerks that the most important ‘law’ 
at the Supreme Court was the ‘Rule of Five.’ He would constantly remind them that it takes 
five justices for the court to reach a decision and they should never forget it.” Eric Segall, 
Supreme Court Justices Are Not Really Judges, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2014), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/11/supreme_court_justices_
are_not_judges_they_rule_on_values_and_politics_not.html; see also ADAM WINKLER,
GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 273 & n.17 (2013) 
(telling the story in more detail).
308. Kapgan, supra note 6, at 97; but see Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McAllister, An 
Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 
225 (1997) (“It may be . . . that Scalia’s failure to build a consensus on the Court will, in 
the end, matter very little. Instead, it is his intellect, his legal principles, and his writing 
ability that will be his legacy to the Court.”). 
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1. Constitutional Originalism 
Justice Scalia was especially well known for his views 
about constitutional interpretation. He believed that 
constitutional language should be interpreted in historical 
context to grasp how the Framers intended their written words to 
be understood.309 He rejected the view that the Constitution is a 
living, evolving document to be interpreted consistent with 
changing times.310 He sometimes quipped that his originalist 
philosophy treated the Constitution as if it were “dead,” but he 
preferred to call it “enduring.”311
The Court’s recent decisions suggest that most Justices are 
prepared to interpret the Constitution so that it remains relevant 
to a changing culture. And even Justice Scalia was willing to 
bend on occasion, at least with respect to the impact of modern 
technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.312 The 
309. Michael D. Ramsey, Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in Practice, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1945 (2017) (referring to Justice Scalia as “the leading 
judicial theorist and advocate of originalism of his era”); see Scalia, supra note 124, at 
862–64 (explaining his support for constitutional originalism despite its faults, but 
conceding that “in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine . . . 
upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging”). 
310. Scalia, supra note 124, at 853–56 (identifying and criticizing scholars he 
considered “non-originalists”). 
311. “The Constitution that I interpret and apply is not living but dead, or as I prefer to 
call it, enduring. It means today not what current society, much less the court, thinks it 
ought to mean, but what it meant when it was adopted.” All Things Considered: 
Originalism: A Primer on Scalia’s Constitutional Philosophy (Nat’l Public Radio broadcast 
Feb. 14, 2016), available at http://www.npr.org/2016/02/14/466744465/originalism-a-
primer-on-scalias-constitutional-philosophy (quoting Justice Scalia). During a 2006 debate 
with Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia explained originalism more colorfully. He objected 
when the moderator asked whether he thought the so-called “living Constitution” was 
“idiotic”: “‘You are misquoting me. . . . I was describing the argument in favor of the 
living Constitution—that it’s a living organism that must grow or become brittle and 
snap. . . . That is idiotic.’” Lithwick, supra note 300 (quoting Justice Scalia). He wondered 
aloud how “a Constitution that clearly allowed for the death penalty now explicitly 
prohibit[s] it.” Id. “‘That’s the living Constitution I am talking about, and it’s the one I 
wish would die.’” Id.
312. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (opining 
that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” and 
holding that use of heat-sensing technology outside defendant’s home to detect possible 
marijuana-growing operation inside amounted to Fourth Amendment search). 
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ultimate fate of Justice Scalia’s originalism depends on the 
jurisprudence of his successors, including Justice Gorsuch.313
2. Statutory Textualism and Disregard of Legislative History 
Justice Scalia was the leading textualist of his era. He 
believed that judges should focus on the text of a statute rather 
than extrinsic sources of meaning.314 While there is nothing new 
about beginning the task of statutory interpretation with the 
“plain language,”315 Justice Scalia would also end with the 
text.316 He explained his method this way: 
The exclusive reliance on text when interpreting text is 
known as textualism. . . . [T]his approach elicits both better 
drafting and better decision-making. . . . Textualism, in its 
purest form, begins and ends with what the text says and 
fairly implies. Its principal tenets have guided the 
interpretation of legal texts for centuries. . . . Textualism is 
not well designed to achieve ideological ends, relying as it 
does on the most objective criterion available: the accepted 
contextual meaning that the words had when the law was 
enacted.317
313. During his confirmation hearings, Judge Gorsuch testified that he considered 
himself a constitutional originalist, but he thought his approach could keep pace with the 
modern world. Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch, to be an Associate 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 115th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 21, 2017), available at https://congressional.proquest.com/congress 
ional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accountid=147014&groupid=1087361&pgId
=b5531681-2674-401c-993c-55f861bf4043&rsId=1628CC1E0A7 (“And what I would say 
is the Constitution doesn’t change, the world around us changes and we have to understand 
the Constitution and apply it in light of our current circumstances.” (responding to question 
from Senator Klobuchar)).  
314. See Antonin Scalia, J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and 
Laws 92 (Mar. 8–9, 1995), available at https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to- 
z/s/scalia97.pdf (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . . Men may 
intend what they will; but . . . only the laws that they enact bind us.”). In his early years on 
the bench, Justice Scalia consulted legislative history on occasion, but as time went on he 
refused to consider it at all. Eventually, he declined to join any part of an opinion that 
discussed legislative history. Morrison, supra note 89, at 16.  
315. E.g., Lake Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 671 (1889) (noting that “when the words 
of a man express his meaning plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, we have no occasion to 
have recourse to any other means of interpretation”). 
316. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER: READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012).
317. Id.
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Justice Scalia’s textualist approach did not mean that he 
was necessarily a strict constructionist—in fact, he disclaimed 
that characterization.318 On the other hand, his rigid textualist 
approach to statutes is difficult to reconcile with his embrace of 
constitutional originalism. He once explained the challenges of 
the originalist approach, which include researching the historical 
context of constitutional language and consulting extrinsic 
documents, including the ratification records of state 
legislatures,319 all analogous to legislative history. 
A survey concluded a decade ago that the federal appellate 
courts had not yet “bought” Justice Scalia’s position that 
legislative history is “per se inauthentic.”320 But the influence of 
his skepticism was both “discernible” and “significant” to some 
observers, who suggested that his cautious approach to 
legislative history might be his “most lasting influence.”321
Justice Scalia once speculated that although he might not win on 
originalism,322 he had made progress in persuading fellow 
justices against the use of legislative history.323 Be that as it 
may, he certainly “narrow[ed] the battlefield.”324
318. Scalia, supra note 314, at 98 (“[S]o-called strict constructionism . . . is a degraded 
form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict 
constructionist, and no one ought to be—though better that, I suppose, than a 
nontextualist.”).
319. Scalia, supra note 124, at 856–57. At least one scholar has aptly questioned how 
the rejection of legislative history as an authoritative source of statutory meaning can be 
reconciled with constitutional originalism. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme 
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History? 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1301, 1302 (1998) (“[T]he new textualists, particularly Justice Scalia, refuse to consider 
the debating history of statutes as relevant context but do consider such history of the 
Constitution and its amendments, sometimes in great detail.”).
320. JOSEPH L. GERKEN, WHAT GOOD IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY? JUSTICE SCALIA IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 100 (2007) (recognizing that “Justice Scalia has 
repeatedly inveighed against the use of legislative history in cases where the statute is 
unambiguous”); see also Morrison, supra note 89, at 16. 
321. GERKEN, supra note 319, at 14; see also id. at 319–20.  
322. See Robert Schapiro, Justice Antonin Scalia: More Quotable Than Influential,
CONVERSATION (Feb. 15, 2016 10:31 PM EST), http://theconversation.com/justice-antonin-
scalia-more-quotable-than-influential-54721 (noting that Justice Scalia’s “attempt to 
reorient interpretation of the Constitution . . . failed to achieve lasting success”).  
323. Senior, supra note 97 (reporting Justice Scalia’s 2013 statement that the Court then 
paid “much more attention to the words of a statute” and “much less [to] legislative 
history” than did “opinions from the eighties, . . . two thirds of [which] were discussing 
committee reports and floor statements and all that garbage,” a change he believed he had 
helped influence); but see Linda Greenhouse, Justice Scalia’s Fading Legacy, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.15,2018),https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/justice-antonin-scalia-legacy 
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3. Dictionaries as Legal Authority 
Compared to his penchant for textualism and his disdain for 
legislative history, considerably less has been written about 
Justice Scalia’s fondness for what might be called dictionary 
shopping.325 The Court has long consulted lay dictionaries to 
determine the ordinary meaning of terms not otherwise defined 
in the statute.326 But to a greater degree than any other Justice in 
history, Justice Scalia routinely referred to dictionary 
definitions,327 which led to a striking increase in the Court’s use 
of dictionaries after he was appointed in 1986.328
The Scalia-initiated trend of relying on dictionaries as 
interpretive authority is cause for concern. Dictionaries do not 
.html  (noting two years after Justice Scalia’s death that Justices “now feel free to invoke 
legislative history,” and no longer feel obligated “to defend or even explain” its use); 
Schapiro, supra note 322 (noting that Justice Scalia changed “how advocates and judges 
talk about statutes, but not how they ultimately interpret them”). 
324. Morrison, supra note 89, at 16. 
325. To illustrate, Justice Scalia once devoted three full pages and two lengthy 
footnotes to explaining the petitioners’ mistake in relying on Webster’s Third International 
Dictionary to interpret the statutory term “modify.” MCI Telecomm’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–28 & nn.2, 3 (1994) (Scalia, J.). He focused on the word’s 
alternative definitions in Webster’s Third—“to make minor changes” or “to make a basic 
or important change”—which “contradict[ed] [the more narrow definition in] virtually all 
others.” Id. at 225–26 (citing just four dictionaries, including Webster’s Third).Conceding 
that he might be “gilding the lily,” he noted that in 1934, when the controlling statute was 
enacted, “the most relevant time for determining a statutory term’s meaning, . . . Webster’s 
Third was not yet even contemplated.” Id. at 228. Instead, he cited the 1934 edition 
(Webster’s Second) and yet another dictionary published in 1993 in declaring that the Court 
had “not the slightest doubt that [moderate change] is the meaning the statute intended.” Id.
at 227.
326. See, e.g., Nix. v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1893). “There being no evidence 
that the words . . . have acquired any special meaning . . ., they must receive their ordinary 
meaning. Of that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice . . . and upon such a 
question dictionaries are admitted . . . as aids to the memory and understanding . . . .” Id.
327. See James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s 
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 
495 (2013) (noting that the number of opinions consulting dictionaries more than doubled 
between 1986 and 2011); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has 
Become A Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 227, 261 (1999) (analyzing Court’s dictionary use during Justice Scalia’s first twelve 
terms). 
328. See, e.g., J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomena to Federal Statutory Interpretation: 
Identifying the Sources of Interpretive Problems, 76 MISS. L.J. 55, 66 (2006) (noting the 
irony that “we are treated to the truly absurd spectacle of august justices and judges arguing 
over which unreliable dictionary and which unreliable dictionary definition should be 
deemed authoritative” (footnote omitted)). 
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reflect the only—or even the best—meaning of a term as used in 
ordinary American English.329 One of the disputes surrounding 
the 1961 publication of Webster’s Third International 
Dictionary, for example, was whether a lay dictionary should 
describe how words are actually used or instead prescribe how 
they should be used.330 Contrary to Justice Scalia’s justifications 
for consulting dictionaries to discover the ordinary meaning of a 
word, many traditional lay dictionaries were compiled by editors 
who focused more on preserving correct usage than on 
describing how ordinary Americans then used and understood 
words.331
More important, consulting dictionaries to interpret 
statutory meaning assumes that statutes are drafted with ordinary 
dictionary definitions in mind. If this were so, Congress could be 
expected to draft a statutory definition for any term it intends to 
carry a specific or unusual meaning. But research does not 
support that implicit hypothesis.332 Legislative drafters may in 
fact lack access to authoritative dictionaries, or simply fail to 
consult them.333 And the time pressure of the legislative 
process334 may mean that drafters have no opportunity to consult 
329. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The 
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 77, 95 & n.84 (2010) (noting scholarly criticism of dictionaries for inaccuracy). 
330. Id. at 96. Justice Scalia demonstrated a clear preference for Webster’s Second. Id.
at 96–97 (explaining than since 2000, Justice Scalia had cited Webster’s Second in twelve 
cases, but Webster’s Third only “discriminatingly.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 213 (2008) 
(recommending several dictionaries). 
331. Brudney & Baum, supra note 327, at 489 (noting that Justice Scalia favored 
Webster’s Second and the American Heritage Dictionary, which lexicographers consider 
prescriptive); see also id. at 507–08 (distinguishing prescriptive dictionaries from 
descriptive).
332. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 938 (2013) (reporting that some survey respondents “specifically 
referenced Justice Scalia—acknowledging that the Court frequently uses dictionaries but 
noting that they remain mostly irrelevant to the drafting process,” including one drafter 
who “said while laughing that ‘Scalia is a bright guy, but no one uses a freaking 
dictionary’”).
333. Id. at 907, 930, 934. Gluck and Bressman also reported that “[m]ore than 50% of 
our respondents said that dictionaries are never or rarely used when drafting,” id. at 938, 
and that “[o]nly 15% said dictionaries were always or often used,” id. at 938 n.111.
334. See, e.g., Jim Tankersley & Alan Rappeport, A Hasty, Hand-Scribbled Tax Bill 
Sets Off an Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/01/us/ 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 76 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 76 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
260 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
a library of dictionaries to ensure that undefined statutory terms 
convey the “ordinary meaning” that a Court might attach after 
consulting a host of lay dictionaries. 
4. Administrative Deference 
By the time he became a judge, Justice Scalia was already 
an expert on administrative law.335 He previously chaired the 
Administrative Conference of the United States336 and led the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.337 As a Justice 
he strongly supported Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes.338 In 2001, for example, 
he wrote a visceral dissent when the Court held that informal 
agency interpretations were not necessarily entitled to Chevron
deference, but should be assessed according to a variety of 
factors.339
politics/hand-scribbled-tax-bill-outcry.html (quoting Senator’s concern that a major tax-
overhaul bill received just before a vote “literally ha[d] hand scribbled policy changes on 
it”). 
335. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, 5
REGULATION 25 (July-Aug. 1981).
336. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Comm. & Admin. Law, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 24 (May 20, 2010) (prepared Statement of the 
Honorable Antonin Scalia), available at https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents 
/Breyer%2520and%2520Scalia%2520Testimony _ May%25202010%2520Congressional %
2520Hearing_0.pdf; see also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Antonin Scalia, https://www.acus 
.gov/contacts/antonin-scalia. Later he was a senior fellow of the Conference.  Id.  
337. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 160, at 1 (statement of Senator Thurmond, 
noting that Judge Scalia’s experience included serving as “assistant attorney general for the 
Office of Legal Counsel”). 
338. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 10 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 118, 119–22 (1990) (explaining and defending Chevron 
deference); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511–14 (1989) (same); but cf. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 
1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron . . . permit[s] executive 
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and 
concentrate federal power in a way . . . difficult to square with the Constitution of the 
framers’ design.”). 
339. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239–61 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 261 (“I dissent even more vigorously from the reasoning that produces the 
Court’s judgment, and that makes today’s decision one of the most significant opinions 
ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its 
consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad.”).
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Just as Justice Scalia’s position on legislative history 
evolved, so did his administrative-deference jurisprudence. In 
1997, he had written for a unanimous Court in Auer v. 
Robbins340 that the Labor Department had discretion to interpret 
its own ambiguous regulations. First, he deferred to the agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous controlling statute under 
Chevron, finding it not “unreasonable.”341 But then, turning to 
the agency’s interpretation and application of its own ambiguous 
regulation, he reasoned that the Secretary’s interpretation 
controlled unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation’s language. After consulting two lay dictionaries, 
Justice Scalia decided that it was neither.342
Auer has been criticized by courts,343 by scholars,344 and 
even by Justice Scalia himself.345 Beginning in 2011, he dropped 
increasingly direct hints that Auer warranted reconsideration, if 
not outright overruling.346 The majority refused to go along. And 
340. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
341. Id. at 458.  
342. See id. at 461.  
343. E.g., Elgin Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 718 
F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2013) (refusing to extend Auer because “[a]ffording deference to 
agency interpretations of ever more ambiguous regulations would allow the agency to 
function not only as judge, jury, and executioner but to do so while crafting new rules”).
344. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions Mean? 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (concluding that the Auer Court seemed 
to be messaging lower courts to give “extraordinary deference” to “agency interpretations 
of agency rules”); see also John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial 
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 (1996) 
(critiquing Seminole Rock, on which Auer relied); but cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306–07 (2017) 
(defending Auer).
345. See infra note 346 (citing Justice Scalia’s separate opinions criticizing Auer).
Justice Thomas reportedly recalled hearing Justice Scalia once remark, “in typical Nino 
fashion, that one of our opinions that had become an important precedent was . . . ‘Just a 
horrible opinion, one of the worst ever.’ I thought briefly about what he had said, and 
whispered ‘Nino, you wrote it.’” Aaron L. Nielson, Cf. Auer v. Robbins, 21 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 303, 305 (2017); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 344, at 299 (noting that Justice 
Scalia was “both Auer’s author and (late in his career) its leading judicial critic”).
346. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would . . . restore the balance originally struck by the 
[Administrative Procedure Act] with respect to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations . . . by abandoning Auer and applying the Act as written.”); see also Decker v. 
Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that “it is 
time” for reconsideration of Auer); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67–
68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing “increasing[] doubt[]” about Auer’s validity). 
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soon after Justice Scalia died, the Court denied certiorari in a 
case asking the Court to overrule Auer.347
IV. ASSESSING JUSTICE SCALIA’S IMPACT ON CIVILITY,
JUDICIAL ETHICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY
[E]ven in the most emotion-laden, politically sensitive case, 
effective opinion writing does not require a judge to 
upbraid colleagues for failing to see the light or to get it 
right.348
A. Background 
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, Judge Voros of the 
Utah Court of Appeals began a presentation on civility in the 
legal profession by decrying the tone of political discourse that 
characterized the 2016 presidential campaign.349 Then he turned 
to the courts, admitting that some judges act “in a way we would 
have to call uncivil,” and confessing that “it started at the top.” 
Recognizing Justice Scalia as “a brilliant jurist,” Judge Voros 
also pointed out that the late Justice was often criticized as an 
“example of incivility.”350 After quoting Justice Scalia’s dissent 
in Obergefell, Judge Voros measured it against the Utah
Standards of Professionalism and Civility,351  which provide that
At least one scholar has applauded Justice Scalia posthumously for changing his mind: 
“Once he realized that what he thought . . . was right was wrong, he switched, and then he 
was a tireless opponent of Auer.” Nielson, supra note 345, at 306 (footnote omitted). 
347. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Any reader of this Court’s 
opinions should think that the [Auer] doctrine is on its last gasp.”).
348. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1197 
(1992) (footnote omitted). 
349. J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Civility in a Time of Incivility, 30 UTAH B.J. 22, 22 (July–
Aug. 2017).  
350. Id. at 23.  
351. Utah is a leader in promoting civility in the legal profession. The Utah Supreme 
Court adopted Standards of Professionalism and Civility in 2003. See, e.g., UTAH S. CT. R. 
14-301, Standards of Professionalism and Civility, https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ 
rules/ucja/view.html?title=Rule%2014-301.%20Standards%20of%20Professionalism%20 
and%20Civility.&rule=ch14/03%20Civility/USB14-301.html; Michael J. Wilkins, Views 
from the Bench: Supreme Court Adopts Professionalism Standard, 16 UTAH BAR J. 31, 31 
(Sept. 2003). In 2015, the Utah Supreme Court linked the Civility Standards to the Utah 
Code of Professional Conduct by providing that serious or repeated violations of the 
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[l]awyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, 
attribute to other counsel or the court improper motives, 
purpose, or conduct. Lawyers should avoid hostile, 
demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral 
communications with adversaries. Neither written 
submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the 
integrity, intelligence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior 
of an adversary unless such matters are directly relevant 
under controlling substantive law.352
“Hostile, demeaning, humiliating?” asked Judge Voros, “I think 
so.” And “Disparaging the intelligence of another?” he asked. 
“Again, I think so.”353 And then he offered some advice to his 
listeners: “[E]ven if you look to Justice Scalia as a model in 
other ways, please do not imitate his tone of incivility.”354
Judge Voros is right.355 The buck stops at the top.356 Judges 
and Justices should be held to standards at least as high as those 
applied to other lawyers,357 setting an example of dignified, 
Standards “may support a finding that the lawyer has violated [the Utah rule] prohibiting 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” See Voros, supra note 349, at 
22 (citing UTAH R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4, cmt. 3a).  
352. Voros, supra note 349, at 23 (quoting UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 
AND CIVILITY R. 3).  
353. Id. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia was not alone. Judge Voros continued by 
discussing intemperate outbursts by other appellate judges. Id. at 23–24 (citing In re
Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 769 F.3d 762, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see also, e.g., Jessie 
Opoien, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice David Prosser to Retire, Replacement Will 
Serve Until 2020, CAPITAL TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/ 
govt-and-politics/election-matters/wisconsin-supreme-court-justice-david-prosser-to-retire-
replacement-will/article_fbd6c7ea-a7e7-535f-8954-2d17c94836af.html. 
354. Voros, supra note 349, at 23. Judge Voros stopped just short of referring to Justice 
Scalia as a bully: “[M]ake no mistake, the conduct condemned by Rule 3—hostile, 
demeaning, and humiliating words and personal attacks—is not just uncivil, but bullying 
and abusive. And to seek a result in our system of justice by bullying is to repudiate the 
rule of law.” Id. at 25.  
355. Judge Voros is not the first judge to express concerns about the rhetoric of 
Supreme Court Justices. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, The Special Professional 
Challenges of Appellate Judging, 35 IND. L. REV. 381, 389 & nn.43, 44 (2002) 
(“Venomous language obscures the law and erodes civility in our profession. It is a 
problem that affects even the United States Supreme Court.” (citing examples)). 
356. See Voros, supra note 349, and accompanying text; see also Randall T. Shepard, 
Judicial Professionalism and the Relations between Judges and Lawyers, 14 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 223, 223 (2000) (“While judges and lawyers are cut from the 
same cloth, judges have many obligations that practitioners do not.”). 
357.  See Everett V. Abbott & Charles A. Boston, The Judiciary and the Administration 
of the Law, 45 AM. L. REV. 481, 512 (1911) (“The bench comes from the bar, and the 
standards of the bench are ultimately the standards of the bar.”).  
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civil, and professional conduct. Judicial incivility and 
intemperance, especially when displayed by members of the 
Supreme Court, set the wrong example for other judges and the 
legal profession. 
Dismayed by the lack of civility that Judge Voros 
highlighted, many state supreme courts have adopted standards 
of professionalism and civility to supplement the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct for lawyers.358 The professionalism 
movement has also addressed judicial civility. As this Part 
explains, however, the development and evolution of judicial 
codes of conduct have followed a different path and timeline. 
Indeed, while most civility and professionalism codes have been 
initiatives of the bench and bar, judicial conduct codes in 
particular were often adopted in response to Congressional 
concerns and initiatives. And one small but influential group is 
exempt from even the standards of conduct that now apply to all 
other federal judges: the nine Justices of the Supreme Court.359
Whether that significant gap warrants reconsideration is 
discussed below. 
Standards of conduct for lawyers and judges alike all trace 
their history to the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. An 
analysis of the century-long effort to encourage lawyer civility is 
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this section touches on 
the professionalism codes and standards pertaining to judges, 
which were initially developed by the ABA and for decades 
were cited as ethical guidelines for federal judges.  But since the 
late 1970s, the federal judiciary’s code of conduct for federal 
judges has departed in significant ways from the ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct.
358. E.g., UTAH S. CT. R. 14-301, supra note 351; see Cheryl B. Preston & Hilary 
Lawrence, Incentivizing Lawyers to Play Nice: A National Survey of Civility Standards and 
Options for Enforcement, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 701, 707–09, 739–44 (2015) 
(surveying and critiquing state professionalism creeds adopted since late 1980s). 
359. See Joseph P. Williams, The Ethical Honor System, USNEWS.COM (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2017-06-09/supreme-court-justices-play- 
by-their-own-ethics-rules (discussing Justices’ travel). 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 79 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 79 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
DISRESPECTFUL DISSENT 265
B. Judicial Conduct Codes 
Judicial codes of conduct have a complex history.360 Two 
parallel systems—state supreme courts overseeing state courts 
and federal courts subject to Congressional oversight—
complicate the picture. While most federal judges are appointed 
for life, some state judges are elected and others are selected 
under merit-based procedures. This section focuses on the 
federal courts, where Justice Scalia spent his entire judicial 
career. 
1. The ABA’s Canons of Judicial Ethics
The bar began calling for canons of judicial ethics soon 
after the ABA issued the Canons of Professional Ethics for 
lawyers.361 The effort gathered force in 1922 when federal judge 
Kennesaw Mountain Landis accepted a generous salary to serve 
as the first commissioner of baseball while still on the bench.362
The ensuing controversy led the ABA to adopt Canons of 
Judicial Ethics in 1924.363
In the meantime, at the urging of then-Chief Justice Taft, 
Congress established the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 
charged with overseeing the business of the federal courts.364
After advisory ethics opinions issued by the Conference began 
360. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 272. Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 
1789, Lievense and Cohn provide a concise overview of early congressional efforts to 
regulate the conduct of federal judges, beyond the Constitution’s provision for appointment 
for life conditioned on the judge’s good behavior. Much of this section’s discussion relies 
on Lievense and Cohn’s work.  
361. Id. at 272–73; see also, e.g., Abbott & Boston, supra note 357, at 506 (calling for 
judicial reform, including a code of judicial ethics). 
362. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 272–73. Judge Landis’s appointment as 
baseball commissioner followed the 1919 World Series scandal. Id. at 273. He resigned 
from the bench after the ABA censured him. The resulting controversy cleared away the 
last opposition to ethical guidelines for judges. Id.
363. 1924 Canons, supra note 59. 
364. Pub. L. No. 67-298, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (1922). That group would later 
become known as the Judicial Conference of the United States, which continues to serve as 
the rule-making and conduct-regulating arm of the federal court system. 28 U.S.C. § 331 
(2012); see also, e.g., Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial 
Conduct Regulation, 31 YALE L. & POLICY REV. 33, 39 & n.26 (2012). 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 79 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 79 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
266 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
citing the 1924 Canons,365 they became guiding principles for 
the federal judiciary over the next several decades.366 But as 
history has shown, that practice changed after 1973, when the 
Conference first adopted its own code of conduct for federal 
judges.
2. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of 
Conduct for U.S. Judges
The failed 1968 nomination of Justice Fortas to serve as 
Chief Justice triggered further efforts to establish a code of 
conduct specifically for federal judges.367 After proposed 
legislation was introduced in Congress, Chief Justice Burger 
called on the Judicial Conference, which adopted several 
resolutions that generated a favorable congressional response.368
These events rekindled ABA efforts to strengthen regulation of 
judicial conduct,369 leading to appointment of an ABA 
committee to revisit the 1924 Canons.370
In 1972, the ABA issued its substantially revamped Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.371 In the meantime, the Judicial 
365. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 274, 275; Remus, supra note 364, at 41 & 
nn.38, 39. Before 1980, neither the Judicial Conference nor its predecessor had any binding 
authority over federal judges. Remus, supra note 364, at 40. 
366. In particular, Canon 19 cautioned appellate judges against issuing separate 
opinions except in cases of special public significance. See supra notes 59–61 and 
accompanying text. Canons 10 and 34 envisioned judges who were “courteous to counsel 
. . . and also to all others . . . in the court,” who refrained from seeking “public praise,” and 
who did not “administer the office for the purpose of  . . . popularity.” 1924 Canons, supra 
note 59, at Canon 10, Canon 34. 
367. Justice Fortas had accepted fees from a foundation associated with a former client 
then under investigation for securities violations. Remus, supra note 364, at 44 & n.51. 
After a filibuster forced President Johnson to withdraw the nomination, Justice Fortas 
continued on the Court for a time, but soon resigned after repeated threats of impeachment. 
Id.; see also Elizabeth King, A Filibuster on a Supreme Court Nomination Is So Rare 
It’s Only Worked Once, TIME.COM (Feb. 8, 2017), http://time.com/4659403/neil-
gorsuch-filibuster-abe-fortas/ (describing downfall of Justice Fortas); see also Lievense 
& Cohn, supra note 56, at 274–75 (discussing Justice Fortas, related inquiries, and 
proposed judicial-reform legislation). 
368. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 275; Remus, supra note 364, at 46–47. 
369. Remus, supra note 364, at 46–47. 
370. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 275. 
371. Id. at 276; ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972), http://fsmsupreme 
court.org/pdf/1972codeofjudicialconduct.pdf [hereinafter ABA Model Code]; see also E. 
Wayne Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct—The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 
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Conference considered whether the ABA Model Code should 
apply to federal judges. A few months later, the Conference 
adopted the first version of what is now the Code of Conduct for 
U.S. Judges. Closely following the ABA Model Code, it included 
a few variations.372 For example, it expressly applied to all 
federal judges except Supreme Court Justices.373
For the most part, the Conference’s adoption of the Code of 
Conduct for U.S. Judges persuaded Congress that the federal 
judiciary could police its own. Even so, Congress remained 
concerned about the lack of standards for judicial 
disqualification.374 To address that concern, it amended and 
expanded the statutory circumstances warranting 
Utah L. Rev. 395, 396 (“[T]the Preface to the Code makes clear that its standards are 
intended to be enforceable.”).   
372. Judicial Conference of the United States, Code of Judicial Conduct for United 
States Judges, 69 F.R.D. 273, 273 (1975) [footnoted hereinafter as Code for U.S. Judges]
(“The Code is based upon the [ABA] Code of Judicial Conduct . . . . To the extent possible 
the language of the [ABA] Code has been retained.”); see Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, April 5–6, 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., H. Doc. No. 93-
103, at 9–11 (adopting ABA Model Code with modifications); Remus, supra note 364, at 
48. The Code for U.S. Judges acknowledged federal statutes governing judicial conduct, 
removed some of the ABA’s commentary about extrajudicial income, and amended the 
ABA canon regulating judges’ political activities. Lievense & Cohn, supra note 56, at 276; 
see also Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www 
.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_0.pdf (March 20, 2014) (providing current text 
of Code for U.S. Judges).
373. See Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at 273 (omitting Supreme Court Justices 
from its reach); Thode, supra note 371, at 395; see also Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox 
Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 138 (2004) (reasoning that the Code for U.S. Judges
“[t]echnically . . . does not govern the Justices” (citations omitted)); see also Warren
Weaver, Jr., Tough Code of Ethics Adopted for Judges in Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, at 1 
(Apr. 7, 1973) (“A tough and comprehensive new code of ethics covering all Federal 
judges except the nine members of the Supreme Court was adopted today by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.” (emphasis added)). 
374. Congressional concerns about judicial disqualification may have been prompted in 
part by then-Justice Rehnquist’s refusal to recuse in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), 
despite having advocated for the government’s position while an Assistant Attorney 
General. Thode, supra note 371, at 403 n.36. Justice Rehnquist’s decision was criticized as 
inconsistent with Canon 3C of the ABA Model Code, even though it did not apply to 
Justices. By amending the language of Canon 3C into Title 28, Congress settled the issue. 
Thode, supra note 371, at 403 n.36. 
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disqualification,375 which were expressly extended to Supreme 
Court Justices.376
3. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act of 1980 
In the aftermath of Watergate and President Nixon’s 
resignation, Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978, which applied to all “judicial officers”377 and required the 
Judicial Conference to appoint a Judicial Ethics Committee to 
enforce the Act.378 The Conference soon proposed legislation 
that would become the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.379 Significantly, the 1980 
Judicial Conduct Act shifted primary authority over misconduct 
complaints and sanctions to the chief judges of the federal courts 
of appeals and circuit judicial councils.380 Congress reserved a 
limited role for the Conference381 and “a loose oversight role” 
for Congress.382 But the Act’s vague definition of “misconduct” 
left it to the Conference and the judicial councils to determine 
375. Thode, supra note 371, at 402 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455). Compare Pub. L. No. 93-
512, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974) with ABA Model Code, supra note 371, at Canon 3C (1972). 
376. Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974); see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (e); Thode, 
supra note 371, at 402. Professor Thode researched the reported cases interpreting and 
applying Canon 3C and 28 U.S.C. § 455 and concluded that the primary legal issue was not 
whether a federal judge was subject to discipline for failing to recuse, but whether the 
judge’s participation in deciding the case was reversible error. Id. at 402; e.g., Shell Oil Co. 
v. United States, 672 F.3d 1283, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating Federal Court of Claims 
judgment for judge’s failure to recuse and remanding for reassignment to different judge). 
377. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 4 
§§ 101–11 (2012)). The Act defined “judicial officer” to include the members of the 
Supreme Court. Id. at § 308(9), 92 Stat. at 1861 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 4 
§ 110(9)). The Judicial Conference may have withdrawn its early opposition to the 1978 
Act for strategic reasons. See Remus, supra note 364, at 48–52. 
378. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 303, 92 Stat. 1824, 1858 (1978) 
[hereinafter 1978 Ethics Act]. 
379. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Judicial Conduct Act]; 
Remus, supra note 364, at 52; see Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the 
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 283, 284–85 (1982).  
380. Remus, supra note 364, at 52; see also id. at 37–38. 
381. See 28 U.S.C. § 357 (2012). 
382. Remus, supra note 364, at 52; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012). 
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what it encompassed.383 By enacting these provisions, Congress 
effectively ceded its sweeping constitutional authority over the 
federal courts to the Judicial Conference,384 authorizing it to 
enforce standards of judicial conduct.385
4. The Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act of 1990 and 
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 
In the 1980s, Congress impeached three federal judges, 
renewing concern about misconduct and the effectiveness of 
Judicial Conference oversight.386 In 1989, Congress amended 
the 1978 Ethics Act, further restricting federal employees, 
including federal judges and Justices, from receiving outside 
income, honoraria, and gifts while broadening the Judicial 
Conference’s enforcement authority.387
As part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,388
Congress enacted the Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform 
Act,389 which established the short-lived National Commission 
on Judicial Discipline and Removal.390 The National 
383. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). Not until 2009 did the Judicial Conference adopt its own rules 
expressly defining what qualifies as judicial “misconduct.” See infra notes 402–03 and 
accompanying text.  
384. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sheldon Jay Plager, Foreword: The Law of Federal 
Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) 
(describing Act as granting the federal judiciary “formal authority to deal with cases of 
misconduct and disability” while reserving to Congress “the ultimate power of removal for 
the few cases warranting that action”). 
385. Remus, supra note 364, at 52, 54. 
386. Id. at 57 & n.127; see Burbank & Plager, supra note 384, at 4 (citing “concerns 
about the difficulty of removing federal judges”); see also Remus, supra note 364, at 57 & 
n.128 (citing proposed bills and amendments pending in 1989). 
387. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989) (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2012)); Remus, supra note 364, at 56; see also 
5 U.S.C. app. § 109(8) (defining “judicial employee”), § 109(10) (defining “judicial 
officer” to include Supreme Court Justices); 5 U.S.C. § 7353(d)(1)(C) (defining 
“supervising ethics office” to include Judicial Conference for judicial branch personnel, 
including judges). In early 1990, the Judicial Conference amended the Code for U.S. 
Judges to incorporate this expanded regulatory authority. Remus, supra note 364, at 56 & 
n.121 (citing REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 14, 15 (Mar. 13, 1990)). 
388. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
389. Id. §§ 401–18 (codified at various sections of Title 28, U.S.C., including 28 U.S.C. 
§ 372 note). 
390. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Title IV, Subtitle II, §§ 408–18, codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 372 note (National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Act).  
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Commission’s final report391 was generally favorable to the 
Judicial Conference, finding that its implementation of the 1980 
Judicial Conduct Act was mostly effective. Among other 
recommendations, the Commission urged Congress to retain 
impeachment as the exclusive method for removing federal 
judges from office.392
5. The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002
For a time, Congress seemed at ease with allowing the 
federal judiciary to self-regulate judicial conduct393 as long as 
the Conference was responsive to public and political 
concerns.394 But the Conference had gradually amended the 
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges until it deviated significantly 
from the ABA Model Code, and the Conference appeared 
increasingly resistant to outside suggestions for regulating 
judicial conduct.395 Other legislation that would have involved 
Congress in regulating the conduct of federal judges failed.396 In 
2002, Congress added a new chapter to Title 28 governing the 
filing and processing of complaints against federal judges,397
superseding a minor subsection of the 1980 Judicial Conduct 
Act. By defining “judge” narrowly, the 2002 legislation 
391. Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152 
F.R.D. 265 (1993). 
392. Id. at 280–81; Remus, supra note 364, at 58 & n.132; see Cynthia Gray, National 
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Calls for Moderate Changes, 77 
JUDICATURE 271, 271 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (summarizing recommendations); see generally
Burbank & Plager, supra note 384 (summarizing National Commission’s work). 
393. “In a word, the [1980] Act relies upon internal judicial branch investigation of 
other judges . . . .” JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITTEE,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT 
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 2006), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/breyer 
committeereport.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Study Committee Report].
394. Remus, supra note 364, at 54; see id. at 61 (noting Congress’s “willing[ness] to 
acquiesce in judicial self-regulation” after 1980 Act).  
395. Id. at 58 (referring to the federal judiciary’s “increasingly insular and assertive 
approach”); id. at 60 (noting that the “Conference appeared unresponsive to calls for the 
introduction of relatively moderate accountability measures . . . aimed at increasing judicial 
legitimacy and improving the quality of judicial conduct regulation”). 
396. See id. at 60. 
397. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107–273, §§ 11041–44, 116 Stat. 1758, 1848–56 (2002) (Judicial Improvements Act of 
2002, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012)). 
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expressly put Supreme Court Justices beyond the Judicial 
Conference’s regulatory authority.398
6. The 2009 Revisions to the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
While the ABA Model Code had become increasingly 
regulatory with subsequent revisions, the Code of Conduct for 
U.S. Judges continued in the form of “guiding principles by 
which judges should abide” rather than black-letter rules of 
conduct.399 In the first decade of the new century, however, the 
Judicial Conference proposed revisions400 that consolidated the 
Canons into just four, but otherwise made no “startling 
substantive changes.”401
398. The 2002 Act added the following new provision: “[T]he term ‘judge’ means a 
circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1). 
Its predecessor subsection in the 1980 Judicial Conduct Act did not specifically define 
“judge,” but rather authorized anyone to file a complaint with the appropriate federal court 
of appeals alleging misconduct or disability against a federal circuit, district, bankruptcy, or 
magistrate judge. See Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036 (1980) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 372(c) (repealed by Pub. L. 107–273, §?11043(a)(1)(B), 116 Stat. 1758, 1855 
(2002)). The 1980 Judicial Conduct Act did not preclude anyone from filing complaints 
against Justices alleging misconduct or disability. See Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary 
and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980, 94 Yale L.J. 1117, 1122 n.31 (1985) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) omitted any 
reference to Supreme Court Justices, and quoting House Committee Report for the 
rationale). The statutes, then and now, are simply silent on how any complaint against a 
Justice is to be handled. Congress undoubtedly retains plenary power to address that gap 
short of initiating impeachment proceedings against a Justice. See text accompanying notes 
468–74 (describing various Congressional proposals that would do so).  
399. Remus, supra note 364, at 65 & n.176; see Gordon J. Quist, Interview: Giving 
Advice on Ethics Seldom Simple, 40 THIRD BRANCH 1, 10 (June 2008). Judge Quist, who 
then chaired the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct, explained that 
“the Committee has always reviewed its Code after the [ABA] adopts and recommends its 
Model Code.” Id. But he disclaimed concern that the Code for U.S. Judges simply follows 
ABA Model Code amendments. Id. He explained that the Code for U.S. Judges takes a 
more aspirational approach: 
The ABA has developed a more detailed regulatory approach in its Model Code. 
Regulations tend to be black and white. Our Canons are guiding principles by 
which [federal] judges should abide. . . . [We] try to get the whole Judiciary to 
adhere to and aspire to achieve these principles, recognizing that there are vast 
areas of judgment.  
Id.
400. Remus, supra note 364, at 65. 
401. Quist, supra note 399, at 10.
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After the revisions were adopted in March 2009,402 the 
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges for the first time included rules 
specifically defining judicial “misconduct.” The rules were most 
recently amended in 2015.  As of this writing, “cognizable 
misconduct” 
(1) is conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 
administration of the business of the courts. Misconduct 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(A) using the judge’s office to obtain special 
treatment for friends or relatives; 
(B) accepting bribes, gifts, or other personal favors 
related to the judicial office; 
(C) having improper discussions with parties or 
counsel for one side in a case; 
(D) treating litigants, attorneys, or others in a 
demonstrably egregious and hostile manner;
(E) engaging in partisan political activity or making 
inappropriately partisan statements; 
(F) soliciting funds for organizations; 
(G) retaliating against complainants, witnesses, or 
others for their participation in this complaint process; 
(H) refusing, without good cause shown, to cooperate 
in the investigation of a complaint under these Rules; 
or
(I) violating other specific, mandatory standards of 
judicial conduct, such as those pertaining to 
restrictions on outside income and requirements for 
financial disclosure. 
(2) is conduct occurring outside the performance of official 
duties if the conduct might have a prejudicial effect on the 
administration of the business of the courts, including a 
substantial and widespread lowering of public confidence 
in the courts among reasonable people. 
(3) does not include: 
(A) an allegation that is directly related to the merits 
of a decision or procedural ruling. An allegation that 
calls into question the correctness of a judge’s ruling, 
402. See Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372. 
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including a failure to recuse, without more, is merits-
related. If the decision or ruling is alleged to be the 
result of an improper motive, e.g., a bribe, ex parte 
contact, racial or ethnic bias, or improper conduct in 
rendering a decision or ruling, such as personally 
derogatory remarks irrelevant to the issues, the 
complaint is not cognizable to the extent that it attacks 
the merits. 
(B) an allegation about delay in rendering a decision 
or ruling, unless the allegation concerns an improper 
motive in delaying a particular decision or habitual 
delay in a significant number of unrelated cases.403
 Justice Scalia’s many dissenting opinions excoriating his 
colleagues and others appear to meet the Conference’s own 
definition of misconduct. His vituperative tone was neither 
necessary to state his points nor relevant to the issues they 
addressed. In particular, his frequent outbursts delivering 
“personally derogatory remarks irrelevant to the issues” did not 
qualify as “merits-related” action, otherwise excluded from the 
definition under subsection (3)(A). Instead, his disrespectful 
rhetoric appears to have violated subsection 1(D) by treating 
“others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner.”  
7. The Judicial Conference’s Ongoing Role in Promoting 
Judicial Civility and Exemplary Conduct 
In addition to its many other statutory duties,404 the Judicial 
Conference regulates the ethical conduct of federal judges405 and 
403. Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, United States 
Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guide-vol02e-ch03.pdf (May 4, 2016) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Conduct and Disability Rules]; see also Code for U.S. 
Judges, supra note 372. 
404. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (requiring Conference to “carry on a continuous study of the 
operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure” and to recommend 
“changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem desirable to promote 
simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and 
the elimination of unjustifiable expense”); see generally Governance & the Judicial 
Conference, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/ 
governance-judicial-conference. 
405. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 111(3) (2012) (designating Judicial Conference to administer 
the 1978 Ethics Act with respect to judicial officers and employees).  
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handles complaints406 that allege “conduct prejudicial to the 
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the 
courts,” or inability “to discharge all the duties of office by 
reason of mental or physical disability.”407 But most of the 
relevant statutes narrowly define “judge” to mean every sort of 
federal judge except Supreme Court Justices.408 For that reason, 
Justice Scalia was not subject to Judicial Conference standards 
and discipline once he joined the Court in 1986.
8. Congressional Oversight of Article III Courts 
The Constitution famously provides that federal judges 
hold office during “good behaviour.”409 Controversies between 
Congress and the federal courts over regulating judicial conduct 
ultimately revolve around which branch of government has the 
constitutional power to decide what constitutes good judicial 
behavior. Congress, with the acquiescence and support of the 
federal judiciary, has exercised some of this regulatory authority 
but has delegated most of it to the federal courts themselves.410
But neither the Supreme Court nor the Judicial Conference 
has set a high standard for judicial civility. Through nearly three 
decades, under two Chief Justices, Justice Scalia wrote hundreds 
of dissents that were at best discourteous and at worst 
egregiously disrespectful. Even though some members of the 
Supreme Court have championed civility and professionalism in 
the law,411 Justice Scalia’s judicial colleagues most often 
acquiesced in his behavior, remaining silent instead of 
expressing disapproval. Worse, some linked their work to his by 
joining his aggressively worded dissents, or by using 
406. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2012). 
407. Id. at § 351(a); see generally 2006 Study Committee Report, supra note 393
(reporting findings of Committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and chaired by 
Justice Breyer in response to congressional concerns about deficiencies in complaint 
processing by chief judges of federal courts of appeals). 
408. See note 398, supra.  Only the judicial disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, 
expressly applies to Supreme Court Justices.  See supra note 376 and accompanying text.  
409. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But Congress can specify the scope of the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Id. at § 2. (enabling Congress to regulate and make 
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
410. See supra notes 380–85 and accompanying text. 
411. See, e.g., infra notes 427–31 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg); 
Thomas, supra note 3, at 515–16.
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intemperate or disrespectful rhetoric of their own. They are in 
part responsible for the legacy of disrespect that Justice Scalia 
left in the Court’s reported opinions.
V. JUDICIAL INCIVILITY, INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY,
AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
Judges need and welcome guidance on their ethical 
responsibilities, and sources such as the Judicial 
Conference’s Code of Conduct provide invaluable 
assistance. But at the end of the day, no compilation of 
ethical rules can guarantee integrity.412
A. Background: The Scalia Effect 
Justice Scalia’s aggressively blunt style of opinion writing 
and the media attention it drew meant that his reputation for 
incivility extended beyond legal circles. A team of political 
scientists studying the differences in rhetoric between the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts concluded that Justice Scalia 
fueled “divisiveness” on the Court, describing his style as 
“belligerent” and noting that he “relentlessly attack[ed] those 
who might disagree with his ideology or judging philosophy.”413
Justice Scalia’s aggressive—albeit sometimes witty—rhetoric 
was read outside academia as well, passages from his dissents 
routinely appearing in the popular media.414 Although members 
of the general public rarely read multi-page court opinions, 
Justice Scalia had a knack for using catchphrases that would 
attract public attention, even if the opinions in which they 
appeared had failed to attract a majority of votes on the Court. If 
412. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 11, S. CT. OF 
THE U.S. (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year- 
endreport.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Report]. 
413. Yalof et al., supra note 102, at 12–13.  
414. E.g., Katy Steinmetz, This Is What “Jiggery-Pokery” Means, TIME (June 25, 
2015), http://time.com/3936188/scalia-jiggery-pokery/ (noting Justice Scalia’s use of 
“interpretive jiggery-pokery” in Obergefell dissent); see Schapiro, supra note 322 
(noting use of “I would hide my head in a bag”). 
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his motive for using disrespectful rhetoric was public 
attention,415 the record shows that he succeeded. 
But a Supreme Court dissent should do more than generate 
attention. It should educate and enlighten judges, lawyers, law 
students, and law professors, and help clarify points of 
disagreement among the Justices.416 If carefully and concisely 
expressed, its reasoning can influence the way the Justices and 
other readers think about legal issues even though it failed to 
garner the support of the majority. The dissent’s role in 
clarifying points of disagreement and shaping legal thinking 
does not, however, justify separate opinions written in a 
pointedly vituperative tone. Disrespectful rhetoric, hyperbole, 
venom, and personal attacks in Supreme Court dissents reflect 
poorly on the entire judiciary.417 And if the justification for 
publishing dissents is in part their capacity to persuade future 
readers,418 a bombastic and disrespectful tone hardly advances 
that purpose. 
Yet Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge both the internal 
and external effects of his biting dissents. Beginning in 1994, 
when he posited that the dissenting tradition reflected favorably 
on the Court, he reassured readers that dissents “do not, or at 
least need not, produce animosity and bitterness among the 
415. See, e.g., Kapgan, supra note 6, at 98–99; but see 1924 Canons, supra note 59, at 
Canon 34 (providing that a judge should not seek public praise or popularity).  
416. See, e.g., Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Acquiescence on the Supreme Court, 36 
JUSTICE SYS. J. 3, 5 (2015) (describing value of dissents); id. at 7 (observing that dissents 
have higher value in “important” cases); Scalia, supra note 5, at 39 (explaining that issuing 
separate opinions “to set forth clear and consistent positions on both sides of the major 
legal issues of the day . . . has kept the Court in the forefront of the intellectual 
development of the law”); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 806 (“Certainly a dissenting opinion 
can serve as a rhetorical resource for those who object to a decision.”).  
417. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 2, at 53 (pointing out that as Supreme Court’s 
“political nature becomes more easily discerned—both because of the issues it is deciding 
and the language used in the Court’s decisions—reverence to the institution, its Justices, 
and more importantly, its decisions, appears to be increasingly scarce”).
418. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5, at 36–37. Justice Scalia explained that dissents “can 
help to change the law,” but as he readily conceded, “[t]hat effect is most common in the 
decisions of intermediate appellate tribunals.” Id. at 36. On the other hand, Justice 
Ginsburg has estimated that up to four times each term, an opinion initially circulated 
internally as a dissent gains sufficient votes to become the opinion of the Court. Ginsburg, 
supra note 5, at 4. But dissents’ internal value as part of the Court’s decisionmaking 
process does not justify publishing verbose diatribes that reflect a lack of respect for judges 
and the American judicial system as a whole.
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members of the Court.”419 Whatever Justice Scalia might have 
thought about dissents’ effects on intra-Court relationships, it is 
much worse for a Supreme Court Justice to engage in 
disrespectful rhetoric than for any other appellate judge to do so. 
A heated dissent cannot diminish the precedential value of the 
Court’s opinion. But if it takes a combative tone toward other 
Justices (or even toward appellate counsel), the dissenting 
opinion reflects unfavorably on the judicial author and threatens 
public respect for the Court as an institution. 
Some of Justice Scalia’s biting rhetoric and sharp 
witticisms might be entertaining to read, but they reflect poorly 
on the Court that failed to do anything about them. In particular, 
Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts, who led the Court during 
Justice Scalia’s tenure, bear some responsibility for allowing his 
dissents routinely to cross “the rhetorical Rubicon between 
professional critique and personal attack.”420 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist even joined many Scalia dissents, turning a blind eye 
to any damage they might do. And while Chief Justice Roberts 
rarely joined a Scalia dissent,421 some of his own separate 
opinions tread dangerously close to the line between expression 
of strong disagreement and disrespectful hyperbole.422
419. Scalia, supra note 5, at 40. Notably, Justice Scalia’s 1994 article addressing 
dissents did not mention the then-new civility standards adopted by the Seventh Circuit in 
1992. See Standards for Professional Conduct Within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit: 
Judges’ Duties to Each Other [hereinafter Seventh Circuit Standards], http://www.ca7.us 
courts.gov/rules-procedures/rules//rules.htm#standards. The Seventh Circuit Standards
include recommendations on improving civility among judges, particularly in judicial 
opinions. As Justice Ginsburg once noted before joining the Court, there is room for 
improvement. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1194–95 (citing several Scalia dissents that 
excoriated the Court’s reasoning). 
420. Porto, supra note 10, at 28. 
421. In their decade together on the Court, the current Chief Justice joined twenty-one 
dissents written by Justice Scalia, two of them only in part.  
422. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting):
Five lawyers [in the majority] have closed the debate and enacted their own 
vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law. Stealing this issue from the 
people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic 
social change that much more difficult to accept. 
The majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment. The right it 
announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent. The 
majority expressly disclaims judicial “caution” and omits even a pretense of 
humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own 
“new insight” into the “nature of injustice.” . . .  As a result, the Court 
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 85 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 85 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
ENTRIKINRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:17 PM 
278 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Justice Scalia will be missed, but not because he was a role 
model for exemplary judicial conduct.423 Historians will assess 
the impact of his tenure on the Court. We cannot yet know what 
his true legacy will be—how his judicial writing will be received 
by future law students, lawyers, judges, and scholars. But Justice 
Scalia likely will be remembered less for the influence of the 
reasoning behind his dissents than for his intemperance in 
expressing his views.424
Justice Scalia was apparently aware of the Court’s fragile 
hold on its own institutional legitimacy. Among the most 
offensive comments in his dissents was a repeated critique of his 
colleagues’ opinions for seeming to reflect or even underscore 
the Court’s own “impotence.”425 He frequently reminded his 
fellow Justices of the Court’s tenuous hold on its own posterity. 
History has already proved him right on that score. The 
conservative “lion on the Court”426 most certainly did not 
elevate public or scholarly opinion of the Court. Instead, his 
scathing dissents cast it into disrepute.  
Before joining the Court, Justice Ginsburg, who would 
become Justice Scalia’s closest friend on the Court, expressed 
her distaste for disrespectful dissent. In 1992, soon after the 
beginning of the civility movement, then-Judge Ginsburg 
observed that if judges expect their decisions to be respected, 
invalidates the marriage laws of more than half the States and orders the 
transformation of a social institution that has formed the basis of human society 
for millennia . . . . Just who do we think we are? 
Id.
423. See, e.g., Voros, supra note 349, at 23; Yalof et al., supra note 102, at 12–13. 
424. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 323; Schapiro, supra note 322. 
425. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s 
approach in Obergefell is a classic of this type: 
Hubris is sometimes defined as o’erweening pride; and pride, we know, goeth 
before a fall. The Judiciary is the “least dangerous” of the federal branches 
because it has “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm” and the States, “even for the efficacy 
of its judgments.” With each decision of ours that takes from the People a 
question properly left to them—with each decision that is unabashedly based not 
on law, but on the “reasoned judgment” of a bare majority of this Court—we 
move one step closer to being reminded of our impotence. 
Id. (citation omitted).
426. E.g., David Helling, Reaction to Antonin Scalia’s Death: “A Lion on the Court 
and an Unwavering Defender of the Constitution”, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 13, 2016), http: 
//www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article60286391.html (quoting Senator 
Blunt).
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they should write with a degree of reserve appropriate to the 
judicial office: 
[T]he effective judge . . . strives to persuade, and not to 
pontificate. She speaks in “a moderate and restrained” 
voice, engaging in a dialogue with, not a diatribe against, 
co-equal departments of government, state authorities, and 
even her own colleagues.427
Then she cited examples of opinions she classified as 
“condemnations” of other judges “that generate more heat than 
light,”428 including several separate opinions authored by Justice 
Scalia.429 She found these examples regrettable, asserting that 
“even in the most emotion-laden, politically sensitive case, 
effective opinion writing does not require a judge to upbraid 
colleagues for failing to see the light or to get it right.”430 The 
soon-to-be next nominee to the Supreme Court was absolutely 
correct.431
427. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1186 (quoting Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested 
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963)). 
428. Id. at 1194. 
429. Id. at 1194–95 & nn.49–51, 54, 57 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 981 (1992) (Scalia,  J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I must . . . respond 
to a few of the more outrageous arguments in today’s opinion, which it is beyond human 
nature to leave unanswered.” . . . “To portray Roe as the statesmanlike ‘settlement’ of a 
divisive issue, a jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that is worth preserving, is nothing 
less than Orwellian.”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633, 636, 638, 644 (1992) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (describing Court’s opinion as “oblivious to our history,” “incoherent,” 
“nothing short of ludicrous,” and “a jurisprudential disaster”); Morgan v. Ill., 504 U.S. 719, 
751–52 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today, . . . the Court strikes a further blow against 
the People in its campaign against the death penalty.”); Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“Justice O’Connor’s 
assertion . . . that a fundamental rule of judicial restraint’ requires us to avoid reconsidering 
Roe, cannot be taken seriously.”)). 
430. Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1197. 
431. Just as her article went to press, Judge Ginsburg was nominated by President 
Clinton to serve on the Supreme Court with Justice Scalia himself. Id. at 1185 n.* Whether 
Judge Ginsburg would have penned the same article after her confirmation as Justice is 
highly doubtful. In 2010, she wrote again about dissents, raising and then sidestepping the 
question whether dissents have a negative effect on the Court’s internal working 
relationships:
Are there lasting rifts sparked by sharply worded dissents? Justice Scalia spoke 
to that question nicely. He said: “I doubt whether any two [J]ustices have 
dissented from one another’s opinions any more regularly, or any more sharply, 
than did my former colleague Justice William Brennan and I. I always 
considered him, however, one of my best friends on the Court, and I think that 
feeling was reciprocated.” The same might be said today about my friendship 
with Justice Scalia. 
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B. The Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges 
1. Relevant Provisions 
The 1924 Canons directly addressed the ethics of opinion 
writing: 
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of 
last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote 
solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence of 
judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of 
opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than 
that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in case 
of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental 
principle, dissents should be discouraged in courts of last 
resort.432
But nothing like that provision has so far appeared in any 
version of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.433
The current Code is primarily aspirational rather than 
mandatory.434 Yet Canon 3 addresses judicial civility, providing 
that a judge, when acting in an official capacity, should “be
patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors, 
witnesses, lawyers, and others” and should “require similar 
conduct of those subject to the judge’s control.”435 The related 
commentary elaborates, providing that the duty to be respectful 
imposed by Canon 3 “includes the responsibility to avoid 
comment or behavior that could reasonably be interpreted as 
harassment, prejudice or bias.”436 And it also explains that a 
judge who has “reliable evidence” that another judge has failed 
to comply with the canons should take “appropriate action,”
Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 4 (quoting Scalia, supra note 5, at 41 (citation omitted)). 
432. 1924 Canons, supra note 59, at Canon 19 para. 4; see also supra note 366 and 
accompanying text. 
433. The ABA Model Code provisions on civility have also evolved over the years.  But 
because Justice Scalia spent his entire judicial career on the federal bench, a full discussion 
of that process is beyond the scope of this article. For general information about those 
developments, see Thode, supra note 371. 
434.  The canons are presented as black-letter aspirational standards. See, e.g., Code for 
U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canons 1 & 2 (“A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and 
Independence of the Judiciary,” and “A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the 
Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities” (emphasis added)). 
435. Id. at Canon 3(A)(3). 
436. Id. at Canon 3(A)(3) cmt.  
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such as “direct communication with the judge . . . [or] reporting 
the conduct to the appropriate authorities.”437
Just as the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges omits any 
standard on writing separate opinions, it also fails to provide 
explicit guidelines for the conduct of judges in their interactions 
with one another. Ironically, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit set the right example twenty-five years 
ago when it adopted its Standards for Professional Conduct.438
With regard to judicial opinions, the Seventh Circuit Standards 
require judges to be “courteous, respectful, and civil in opinions, 
ever mindful that a position articulated by another judge is the 
result of that judge’s earnest effort to interpret the law and the 
facts correctly.” They also provide that a judge must in “all 
written and oral communications . . . abstain from disparaging 
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning 
comments about another judge.”439
2. Reach of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges
In 2011, Chief Justice Roberts took it upon himself to 
announce in his annual report to Congress440 that “[t]he Code of 
437. Id. at Canon 3(B)(5) cmt. Just who the “appropriate authorities” are with respect to 
the conduct of Supreme Court Justices is the central question of this Part.   
438. Seventh Circuit Standards, supra note 419:  
Judges’ Duties to Each Other 
1. We will be courteous, respectful, and civil in opinions, ever mindful that a 
position articulated by another judge is the result of that judge’s earnest effort to 
interpret the law and the facts correctly. 
2. In all written and oral communications, we will abstain from disparaging 
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments about 
another judge. 
3. In all written and oral communications, we will abstain from disparaging 
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments about 
another judge. 
Id.
439. Id. The author’s exhaustive research failed to unearth any evidence that the 
Supreme Court has ever taken a position on the Seventh Circuit Standards generally or 
their judicial civility provisions in particular.  
440. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (“The Chief Justice shall submit to Congress an annual report 
of the proceedings of the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legislation.”). 
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Conduct, by its express terms, applies only to lower federal 
court judges.”441 He went on to explain the rationale:
That reflects a fundamental difference between the 
Supreme Court and the other federal courts. Article III . . . 
creates only . . . the Supreme Court . . . , but it empowers 
Congress to establish additional lower federal courts . . . . 
Because the Judicial Conference is an instrument for the 
management of the lower federal courts, its committees 
have no mandate to prescribe rules or standards for any 
other body.442
But the Compliance section of the Code, which dictates who 
must comply with its provisions, defines “judge” broadly to 
mean “[a]nyone who is an officer of the federal judicial system 
authorized to perform judicial functions.”443 Supreme Court 
Justices surely qualify under that definition. 
441. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 3. As the Chief Justice recognized, the Code for 
U.S. Judges, by its express terms, does not apply to Supreme Court Justices. But as he 
conceded, statutes requiring financial disclosures do. Id. at 6. Moreover, Congress in 1974 
amended what was then Canon 3C of the Code for U.S. Judges into the disqualification 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and expressly applied those provisions to Supreme Court Justices, 
see id. at § 455(a); see also Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 1, 88 Stat. 1609 (1974). Thus, while 
Canon 3C itself does not expressly apply to the Justices, § 455 and its mandatory 
disqualification provisions unquestionably do. 
The Chief Justice also reported in 2011 that the Court had adopted “an internal 
resolution” agreeing to comply with Conference rules on gifts and extrajudicial 
compensation. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 6–7. But he did not mention that the 1978 
Ethics Act, with its restrictions and reporting requirements for extrajudicial compensation 
and gifts, expressly applies to Supreme Court Justices. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101(f)(11), 
109(10) (2012). Adopting an internal resolution to voluntarily comply with Conference 
rules that mirror existing federal statutes suggests that some Justices might question the 
constitutionality of statutory ethics requirements that expressly apply to the Supreme 
Court. But no direct evidence suggests that the Court has ever challenged the applicability 
of ethics statutes to the Justices, including the 1978 Ethics Act as well as the 
disqualification statute, which Congress amended in 1940 to expressly apply to all federal 
judges, including the Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 455 note. 
442. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 3–4. No doubt the Chief Justice was relying on the 
scope provision of the Code, which does not mention Supreme Court Justices. See Code for 
U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at 1–2. But his point begs the question. The Conference is “an 
instrument for the management of the lower federal courts” only because Congress in 
2002, perhaps at the Supreme Court’s behest, expressly restricted its reach to judges of the 
lower federal courts. Before then, no such restrictive definition appeared in the relevant 
statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (repealed 2002); see also supra notes 397–98 and 
accompanying text. 
443. Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canon 5 cmt.
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3. Federal Judicial Center Guidelines on Opinion Writing 
The Federal Judicial Center manual on judicial writing444
generally supports the right of judges and justices to write 
separate opinions. The Writing Manual nonetheless cautions 
judges against doing so for the wrong reasons, acknowledging 
that “[d]issenting opinions are written at a potential cost.”445
A dissent that sounds strident or preachy may contribute to 
divisiveness and ill feelings in the court, may undermine 
the authority of the majority opinion and of the court as an 
institution, and may create confusion. Whether judges 
should dissent depends on the nature of the case and the 
principle at issue. Judges generally should not write 
dissenting opinions when the principle at issue is settled 
and the decision has little significance outside the specific 
case. Cases that involve emerging legal principles or 
statutory interpretation in areas that will affect future 
activities of the bar, the public, and the government are 
more likely to warrant dissenting opinions than cases of 
limited application. The issue should be significant enough 
that the judge’s “fever is aroused” as one judge said, but the
motivation for writing a dissent should be to further the 
development of the law rather than to vent personal 
feelings. Judges considering whether to dissent should ask 
themselves whether the likely benefits outweigh the 
potential costs.446
444. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR 
JUDGES (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter Writing Manual]. The Federal Judicial Center is a 
creature of Congress, directed by statute “to further the development and adoption of 
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United States” by providing research, 
training, and staff support to the Judicial Conference and its committees.  Pub. L. 90-219, 
81 Stat. 664 (1967) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (2012)). The Chief 
Justice chairs the Center’s governing board. 28 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1); see About the FJC,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/about. 
445. Writing Manual, supra note 444, at 29. 
446. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Judge Wald has wisely cautioned judges against 
using intemperate rhetoric in their opinions, citing the animosity that can result:  
The temptation can be overpowering for a writing judge to give vent to 
longstanding frustrations with a colleague by pejorative references to his point of 
view as “hopelessly muddled”; “reminiscent of Marie Antoinette’s advice to let 
them eat cake”; “beyond all reason”; “pure speculation and fantasy”; “a 
Linnaean leap”; “shoddy”; an “ad hoc judgment”; “devoid of precedent”; 
“ungoverned by law.” Chronic antagonists relentlessly dig out old cases or even 
old law review articles to show inconsistencies in each other’s positions. 
Tensions build on a court as judges of all stripes work together over decades. 
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And when a judge decides to write a dissent, the Writing Manual 
urges caution in choosing the content and tone of the opinion: 
A dissenting opinion should not simply slash at the 
majority opinion or its author. Personal attacks, offensive 
language, or a condescending tone should not be used,
although some judges believe that expressing moral outrage 
and restrained indignation may sometimes be 
appropriate.447
C. Effects of Incivility in Dissent on Judicial System Integrity 
In 1953, long before the beginning of today’s civility 
movement, Professor Pound expressed concern about the impact 
of “heated” dissents on the integrity of the judicial system.
Maintenance of our characteristic American constitutional-
legal polity demands that the courts hold, as they have in 
the past, the respect and confidence of the public. What 
amounts to attacks on our courts from within, however 
well-intentioned and motivated only by sincere convictions 
as to the precise content and application of particular legal 
precepts[,] are highly unfortunate at this time if they ever 
had a place in the common-law judicial process.448
Far too many dissents authored by Justice Scalia amounted to 
stinging attacks from within. He routinely attacked his 
colleagues (often singling them out by name) for expressing 
The result is often, unconsciously or even consciously, to let their heartfelt likes 
or dislikes for other judges seep into their rhetoric. 
Wald, supra note 90, at 1381.  
447. Writing Manual, supra note 444, at 29 (emphasis added). Judges should, for 
similar reasons, exercise restraint in writing concurring opinions: 
Most of the considerations applicable to dissenting opinions also apply to 
concurrences. . . . A judge should not write a concurring opinion simply to add a 
point of view or personal statement that does not further either the decisional or 
educational value of the majority opinion. In deciding whether to write a 
concurring opinion, the judge should ask the question: Am I writing this for 
myself or for the good of the court? 
Id. at 30; see also Scalia, supra note 5, at 33 (disapproving “separate concurrences that are 
written only to say the same thing better than the court has done, or, worse still, to display 
the intensity of the concurring judge’s feeling on the issue before the court” and asserting 
that he regarded “such separate opinions as an abuse, and their existence as one of the 
arguments against allowing any separate opinions at all”).  
448. Pound, supra note 31, at 797 (emphasis added) (criticizing injudicious dissents 
repeatedly issued by California Supreme Court Justice Jesse Carter).
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points of view that differed from his own and often criticized the 
Court’s prior opinions, including those authored by his fellows 
just a few years earlier.
Disrespectful Scalia-style judicial opinions not only reflect 
poorly on the integrity of the Court and the judicial system; they 
send the wrong message about acceptable professional 
demeanor.449 Justice Scalia sometimes said that he wrote his 
dissents for law students450—the group most vulnerable to the 
influence of his negative tone. Yet from the beginning of his 
judicial career, he must have understood his duty to set a good 
example. Calls for judges to model appropriate behavior are not 
new:
Judges must, by example and by comments in written 
opinions, set the proper tone of civility in the courtroom. 
One has only to peruse the pages of current volumes of 
reported cases to come upon vitriolic and demeaning 
condemnations by the score of a court, judicial colleagues’ 
opinions, or attorneys. Like it or not, judges are role models 
in our profession. Judges cannot ask lawyers to accept a 
standard of professional conduct to which they do not 
abide.451
Now that Justice Scalia is no longer a member of the Supreme 
Court, the Justices must take the initiative to ensure that every 
one of its published opinions, whether written for the Court or as 
a separate opinion, sets an example of civility for all other courts 
and judges. 
The 1924 Canons, the ABA Model Code, the Code of 
Conduct for U.S. Judges, and the Seventh Circuit Standards
differ in some respects, but they share an essential norm 
expecting  judges to promote “public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary,”452 and to be “patient, 
449. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 323 (referring to the sarcasm and derogatory tone 
characteristic of Justice Scalia’s written opinions: “I think that this sends exactly the wrong 
message to law students and attorneys about what type of discourse is appropriate in a 
formal legal setting and what is acceptable in speaking to one another”). 
450. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 39; Senior, supra note 97. 
451. Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 513, 519–20 (1994) (reporting on the then-recently adopted Seventh Circuit 
Standards); see also, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 348, at 1194.  
452. Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canon 3(A)(3) cmt.; see also ABA Model 
Code, supra note 371, at Canon 1, R. 1.2 (requiring judges to “avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety.”); id. at Canon 1, R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (describing test for appearance 
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dignified, respectful, and courteous,”453 especially when acting 
in an adjudicative capacity. This norm does not call for artificial 
judicial consensus; indeed, appellate judges are expected to 
approach cases differently and sometimes to disagree on 
outcomes. But every set of canons, rules, and standards for 
judicial conduct has incorporated an expectation of judicial 
civility, respect, dignity, and courtesy. And measured against 
any of these guideposts, many of Justice Scalia’s dissents were 
outside the norm. 
The Justices should accept their duty to model civility and 
courtesy instead of resisting calls to comply with standards of 
conduct that apply to all other federal judges.454 Because the 
public hears from the Court only through its opinions, every 
Justice’s published opinions must exemplify civility and 
dignity.455
of impropriety as “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that 
the judge . . . engaged in . . . conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s . . . impartiality, 
temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”); id. at Canon 2, R. 2.3(A), (B) (requiring 
judge to “perform the duties of judicial office . . . without bias or prejudice” and barring 
judge “by words or conduct” from showing “bias or prejudice”); id. at Canon 2, R. 2.3 cmt. 
2 (defining bias or prejudice to include “epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative 
stereotyping; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile 
acts . . . and irrelevant references to personal characteristics”). 
453. Code for U.S. Judges, supra note 372, at Canon 3(A)(3). The ABA Model Code
includes similar provisions emphasizing patience, dignity, and courtesy. ABA Model Code,
supra note 371, at R. 2.8(B). The Seventh Circuit Standards are even more expansive.
Seventh Circuit Standards, supra note 419, at R. 1, 2 (requiring judges to be “courteous, 
respectful, and civil in opinions” and to “abstain from disparaging personal remarks or 
criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments”). And the 1924 Canons also included a 
courtesy provision. 1924 Canons, supra note 59, at Canon 10 (providing that judges 
“should be courteous” to “everyone involved in the administration of justice”).  
454. See, e.g., 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 3–4. This resistance may reflect the 
Justices’ knowledge that the Code expects judges to act when one of their number fails to 
meet its standards. See text accompanying note 437, supra; cf. Heffernan v. City of 
Paterson, ___U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (“[I]n the law, what is sauce for the 
goose is normally sauce for the gander.”).  
455. A Justice’s freedom to dissent does not—or should not—include authority to 
express disrespect for judicial colleagues, appellate counsel, parties, or the Court as an 
institution. See William G. Ross, Civility Among Judges: Charting the Bounds of Proper 
Criticism by Judges of Other Judges, 51 FLA. L. REV. 957, 962 (1999) (“[S]ome judges 
have been known to cast aspersions upon the competence, diligence, integrity, or 
temperament of other judges. Judges should categorically abstain from such comments 
because they detract from the dignity of the judicial system and tend to impugn its 
integrity.”); see also Brennan, supra note 1, at 435 (“Dissent for its own sake has no value, 
and can threaten the collegiality of the bench.”). 
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D. Possible Solutions 
It is too late to prevent the publication of intemperate Scalia 
dissents. But anticipating improved judicial civility in the future, 
this section highlights several proposals and legislative 
initiatives to address judicial misconduct, including suggestions 
that existing standards of conduct should apply to Supreme 
Court Justices.456
1. Internal Action by the Court 
Dean Chemerinsky has pointed out that in several respects, 
the Court is guilty of a “monumental failure to communicate 
with the American public.”457 He has criticized the extreme 
sarcasm in Justice Scalia’s dissents458 and has advocated for 
improvements in Supreme Court communications, including 
“presumptive word and page limits” for published opinions.459
Additionally, Dean Chemerinsky has recommended that the 
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges apply to the Justices.460 The 
456. Congress has already applied financial disclosure requirements and 
disqualification standards to the Justices. See supra notes 376 & 441; see also 5 U.S.C. 
app. 4 § 101(a), (d), (f)(11); 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 109(10); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The 
constitutionality of those longstanding ethics statutes has never been seriously questioned. 
See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A 
Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 242 (1993) (“[P]ermitting Congress to 
authorize judicial disciplinary procedures would not pose a significant threat to judicial 
independence or the separation of powers.”). 
457. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 313.  
458. Id. at 323 (“No justice in Supreme Court history has consistently written with the 
sarcasm of Justice Scalia.”).  
459. Id. at 324–25 (recognizing that the Court “believes that the discipline of word and 
page limits leads to better briefs,” and opining that “[t]he same is true for the Court”). But 
he offers no specifics. 
The Court could adopt internal operating rules that limit the number of published 
pages allocated to separate opinions. It is difficult to justify publishing a disrespectful 
opinion of a lone dissenter, particularly when publishing dissents seemed only to encourage 
Justice Scalia to write more frequent, longer, and ever more disrespectful dissents that 
often disparaged the Court itself. The Court could also disqualify any disrespectful separate 
opinion from publication. A dissent of this type could be preserved as part of the case 
record, but might appear only on the Court’s website or elsewhere instead of being 
published with the opinion of the Court.  
460. Id. at 328. Dean Chemerinsky observes that “with the exception of a few laws, the 
laws regulating ethics that all other judges must follow are not applicable to the Supreme 
Court.” Id. But the relevant statutes that do apply are significant. The Ethics in Government 
Act, which requires financial disclosures by federal employees, expressly applies to the 
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American Judicature Society has advanced the same proposal.461
This author agrees. No constitutional, statutory, or even 
jurisprudential impediment prevents the Court from adopting an 
internal resolution to apply the Code to its own members.462 If 
Justices. See 5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101(a), (d), (f)(11), 109(10). The judicial disqualification 
statute does as well. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see also note 440, supra.
Although the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980 does not reach Supreme Court Justices, see 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1), this means only 
that the Judicial Conference lacks express authority to apply the Code for U.S. Judges to 
them. But just as Congress extended statutory ethics requirements to the Justices, it could 
amend § 351(d)(1) to extend the Conference’s authority to include the Supreme Court. See
note 398, supra, and accompanying text; but see 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 5, 11 
(expressing opposition to extending the Code to Justices).  
461. Editorial, Supreme Court Justices and the Code of Conduct, 95 JUDICATURE 4, 4 
(July–Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Justices and the Code] (calling on Court to apply Code for
U.S. Judges to Justices).  
462. See note 441, supra. The Justices themselves are apparently not of one mind as to 
whether the Court has already done so. Asked at a 2011 congressional hearing why the 
Code for U.S. Judges does not apply to the Supreme Court, Justices Kennedy and Breyer 
testified in ways that were not entirely in harmony. Justice Kennedy responded that the 
Code applies to the extent that the Court has adopted an internal resolution to voluntarily 
comply. Justice Breyer explained his belief that the Code applies, calling statements to the 
contrary a reflection of “wrong thinking.” He also reported that he consults the ethics rules 
for federal district judges, as well as outside ethics experts and other resources. Supreme 
Court 2012 Budget, Hearing Before the H. Appropriations Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & 
Gen. Gov’t, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 14, 2011), available at https://www.c-span.org/ 
video/?299037-1/supreme-court-2012-budget&start=1687# (partial transcript on file with 
author).
Justices Breyer and Kennedy may have misunderstood the question as well as the 
relevant Code provisions. First, the mandatory disqualification provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455 have expressly applied to the Justices for more than forty years, even though Canon 
3C of the Code does not. See note 441, supra, and accompanying text. Second, the Code
addresses a multitude of ethical issues that go well beyond disqualification. While Justice 
Kennedy’s response referred to an internal Court resolution to comply with the Code, the 
Chief Justice’s 2011 annual report issued several months later explained that “the Court has 
had no reason to adopt the Code of Conduct as its definitive source of ethical guidance” 
because Justices consult other sources as well. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 5. The 
Chief Justice’s only reference to an “internal resolution” cited a 1991 Court resolution to 
“follow the Judicial Conference regulations [on gifts and outside income] as a matter of 
internal practice.” Id. at 6–7. But the statutory provisions that deal with financial 
disclosures and restrictions on gifts have expressly applied to the Justices since 1978. See 
note 441, supra, and accompanying text; see also 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501–02, 503(3), 505(2). 
The 2011 Report does not mention any Court resolution to comply with the Code.
In their Congressional testimony, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer 
emphasized the unique role of Justices who, unlike other federal judges who can be 
replaced if they recuse, have a “duty to sit” to avoid a tie vote. But research has suggested 
that “in only a small fraction of cases in which one justice recuses him- or herself . . . does 
a tie result,” and “recusals generally do not produce equally divided Courts.” Ryan Black 
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the Court exercises its inherent constitutional authority to self-
regulate by adopting the Code, it is hard to imagine how that 
decision could be subject to constitutional challenge.463 To the 
contrary, it would reflect well on the integrity of the Supreme 
Court and that of the entire federal judiciary. 
Compliance with the Code would not be onerous.464 Canon 
3C already applies to the Justices because Congress amended its 
language into the disqualification statute, which expressly 
applies to them.465 The only other mandatory Code provisions 
require judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety—surely not too much to ask of Justices who enjoy 
life tenure.466 Aside from the Code’s provisions for 
disqualification, which mirror the statutory requirements, all of 
its other provisions are aspirational. And the Chief Justice 
reported as recently as 2011 that individual Justices already 
“consult” the Code for guidance on ethical issues.467
2. Legislative Initiatives 
Some earlier legislative initiatives addressing judicial 
conduct were reintroduced in 2017. Among them was the 
Supreme Court Ethics Act,468 which would require the Court to 
& Lee Epstein, Recusals and the "Problem" of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75, 80–81 (2005). 
463. If the Court fails to adopt such a resolution, Congress could close the loophole 
simply by redefining the term “judge” for purposes of the statute governing the filing and 
processing of complaints, and by designating the Judicial Conference or the Court itself to 
handle those complaints. See 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1) (“[T]he term ‘judge’ means a 
circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge . . . .”); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 620(b)(4) (directing Federal Judicial Center to provide staff, planning and 
research support to Judicial Conference and its committees). But even if the Judicial 
Conference lacks explicit regulatory “jurisdiction” over the Supreme Court, nothing 
prevents the Court itself from complying with the norms of conduct that the federal 
judiciary’s own policymaking body has endorsed. See 28 U.S.C. § 331. 
464. Justices and the Code, supra note 461, at 5 (“[T]he rules are not burdensome.”).  
465. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).  
466. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, 
shall hold their offices during good behaviour . . . .”).  
467. 2011 Report, supra note 412, at 5, 11. 
468. News Release, Ofc. of Sen. Christopher S. Murphy, Murphy, Blumenthal, 
Slaughter Introduce Supreme Court Ethics Bill to Restore Public Confidence in the 
Nation’s Highest Court (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
press-releases/murphy-blumenthal-slaughter-introduce-supreme-court-ethics-bill-to-restore 
-public-confidence-in-the-nations-highest-court.  
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adopt a code of ethics incorporating the canons of the Code of 
Conduct for U.S. Judges, with appropriate modifications.469 And 
some in Congress have called on the Court either to adopt the 
Code or to subscribe to its own ethical rules.470
Another was the Judicial Transparency and Ethics 
Enhancement Act,471 proposing an Inspector General for the 
Judicial Branch who would be subject to removal by the Chief 
Justice.472 The idea has generated some support473 as well as 
469. Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2017, S. 835, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). As of 
Jan. 1, 2018, the Senate bill had ten co-sponsors, including several members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. All Information (Except Text) for S.835, CONGRESS.GOV, https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/835/all-info?r=2; see also Supreme Court 
Ethics Act of 2017, H.R. 1960, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). Virtually identical to the 
Senate bill, the House bill had eighty co-sponsors by January 1, 2018. All Information 
(Except Text) for H.R. 1960—Supreme Court Ethics Act of 2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https:// 
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1960/all-info?r=1. 
470. H. Res. 568, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). Similar proposals have been 
introduced in Congress for years. See, e.g., Remus, supra note 364, at 69 & n.185 (citing 
H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (2001), which would have imposed a code of judicial conduct on 
Supreme Court Justices).  
471. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act, S. 2195, 115th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (2017) [hereinafter Transparency and Ethics Act]. Senator Grassley first introduced a 
bill to create an Inspector General for the federal judiciary in 2006. All Information (Except 
Text) for S.2195—Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2017,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2195/all-info.  
472. Transparency and Ethics Act, supra note 471. Similar legislation was introduced 
as early as 1995. See, e.g., Diane M. Hartmus, An Inspector General for the Federal 
Courts, 81 JUDICATURE 188, 188 (Mar.-Apr. 1998). The idea has been considered by 
Congress repeatedly ever since.   
Senator Grassley’s remarks when the legislation was introduced reflected his reasons 
for sponsoring the bill. He observed that two federal entities that receive less funding than 
the federal judiciary both have their own Inspectors General (IG). He also expressed 
concerns about judicial conduct and the effectiveness of Judicial Conference oversight of 
misconduct-complaint processing: 
[T]he current practice of self-regulation of judges with respect to ethics and the 
judicial code of conduct has time and time again proven inadequate. In fact, in 
the past seven years, the Senate received articles of impeachment for not one but 
two Federal judges.  
. . . . . 
Judges are supposed to maintain impartiality. They’re supposed to be free from 
conflicts of interest. An independent watchdog for the federal judiciary will help 
its members comply with the ethics rules and promote credibility within the 
judicial branch of government. The . . . Act will not only help ensure continued 
public confidence in our federal courts and keep them beyond reproach, it will 
strengthen our judicial branch. 
115th Cong., 1st Sess., Cong. Rec. S7892–93 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.congress.gov/ 
crec/2017/12/06/CREC-2017-12-06-pt1-PgS7892.pdf (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
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considerable controversy, including published accounts of 
opposition by some Justices and former Justices.474
E. The Chief Justice’s 2018 New Year’s Resolution: 
Revisiting Conduct Standards for Federal Judges 
Two days after the Inspector General bill was re-introduced 
in 2017, the media reported allegations of sexual improprieties 
by Judge Kozinski.475 More women soon came forward, and the 
Ninth Circuit began an investigation. Judge Kozinski apologized 
and announced his immediate retirement.476
473. Hartmus, supra note 472, at 219–20 (supporting concept but suggesting revisions 
to then-most-recent bill); see also Diane M. Hartmus, Inspection and Oversight in the 
Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 243, 267–69 
(1999) (same). Professor Rotunda supported a similar proposal, criticizing the handling of 
a misconduct complaint against a federal judge in the Ninth Circuit. Ronald D. Rotunda, 
Judicial Transparency, Judicial Ethics, and a Judicial Solution: An Inspector General for 
the Courts, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 301, 310, 316–25 (2010) (explaining the benefits of an IG 
in bolstering public confidence that judicial misconduct will be addressed).  
474. See, e.g., Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 789–97 (2015) (reviewing IG proposals and explaining objections); 
Eric Robbins, In re Nottingham, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 783, 794 (2010) (arguing 
against IG proposal as impermissibly intruding on judicial independence); Rotunda, supra 
note 473, at 301–02 & nn.5–8 (reporting former Justice O’Connor’s opposition); Lara A. 
Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always 
Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 439, 
464 (2009) (noting that renewed efforts to create IG had “elicited a condemning response 
from the judiciary”); Donald E. Campbell, Should the Rooster Guard the Henhouse: 
Evaluating the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 381, 407 
(2009) (“[T]he proposed legislative cure is more harmful than the disease.”); Bruce Moyer, 
Inspector General Bills Rile Judiciary, 53 FED. LAW. 10, 10 (June 2006) (reporting 
“[w]idespread alarm [that] has gripped the federal judiciary” over IG proposals and 
reporting its opposition to similar initiatives in 1996); Tori Richards, Warily Eyeing the 
Idea of an I.G.: Congressional Bills Would Create an Inspector for Federal Courts, 5 ABA
J. E-REPORT 4 (May 19, 2006) (referring to Justice Ginsburg’s comment that the idea was 
“really scary,” and reporting ABA’s opposition). 
475. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused 




476. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Federal Appeals Judge Announces Immediate 
Retirement Amid Probe of Sexual Misconduct Allegations, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-appeals-judge-announces 
-immediate-retirement-amid-investigation-prompted-by-accusations-of-sexual-misconduct/ 
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The Chief Justice, no doubt anticipating renewed 
Congressional concern about Judicial Conference oversight of 
judges’ conduct, addressed the issue in his 2017 year-end report 
to Congress, announcing the formation of a working group to 
study this “new challenge”: 
Events in recent months have illuminated the depth of the 
problem of sexual harassment in the workplace, and events 
in the past few weeks have made clear that the judicial 
branch is not immune. The judiciary will begin 2018 by 
undertaking a careful evaluation of whether its standards of 
conduct and its procedures for investigating and correcting 
inappropriate behavior are adequate to ensure an exemplary 
workplace for every judge and every court employee. . . . 
These concerns warrant serious attention from all quarters 
of the judicial branch.477
Whether the working group’s study of judicial misconduct 
will be broad enough include a review of the sort of intemperate 
and disrespectful language that Justice Scalia used in his judicial 
writing remains to be seen. But the Scalia approach—bullying 
and bombast, invective and attack—and its effect on the Court 
and the judicial system478 should be considered as part of the 
group’s work and its recommendations for addressing and 
preventing inappropriate judicial behavior. 
F. Suggestions for Constructive Alternatives 
Justice Scalia’s reputation for vitriolic opinions still 
resonates around the world.479 The Court can no longer ignore 
2017 /12 /18 /6e38ada4-e3fd-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e _ story.html?utm_term = .a3b10c15ea 
56.
477. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2017 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 11–12, S.
CT. OF THE U.S. (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2017 
year-endreport.pdf. The working group was assembled by the director of the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Chief Justice Roberts 
Calls for Review of Procedures for Protecting Court Employees From Misconduct, CNN 
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/politics/roberts-judicial-misconduct/ 
index.html.
478. See Ross, supra note 455, at 957–58 (“[I]ncivility among judges is in many ways 
more troubling than is incivility in other branches of the legal profession or the government 
because civility is one of the hallmarks of judicial temperament.”). 
479. See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Justice Antonin Scalia Dead at 79, TIMES OF ISRAEL
(Feb. 14, 2016, 1:54 AM IST), https://www.timesofisrael.com/justice-antonin-scalia-dead 
-at-79/ (referring to the “mocking Scalia who in 1993 criticized a decades-old test used by 
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the public perception that his scorched-earth approach to 
dissents was approved (and perhaps encouraged) by the rest of 
the Court. Every Justice should instead counsel fellow Justices 
against issuing opinions that cast the Court in a negative light.480
And whatever becomes of the recently appointed working 
group’s investigation, the Judicial Conference should undertake 
its own study of judicial incivility, focusing on its impact on the 
public perception of the federal courts, the profession of law, 
and the legal system as a whole. As the policymaking body for 
the federal courts, the Conference has the statutory obligation to 
recommend changes that will “promote . . . fairness in 
administration, the just determination of litigation, and the 
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”481
The Conference is particularly well positioned to consider 
the positive effect of the Seventh Circuit Standards that directly 
apply to judges. If they have substantially improved civility in 
the Seventh Circuit, the Conference should consider adding at 
least some of those provisions to the Code of Conduct for U.S. 
Judges. And the Conference should also see that the same 
expectation of civility applies equally to the Justices of the 
Supreme Court, whose conduct, right or wrong, sets the national 
standard. Appointment to the nation’s highest Court demands 
conduct worthy of the dignity of the office. Its members serve as 
exemplars for civil public discourse. They may disagree in 
dissent, but they must not demean. The reputation of the federal 
judiciary depends on the Justices’ regulation of their own 
conduct.
It has often been said that judges are teachers.482 But what 
have other judges, lawyers, and future lawyers learned from 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinions? Far too many served only 
the court to decide whether laws or government policies violated the constitutionally 
required separation of church and state,” and quoting Scalia rhetoric). 
480. This is so even if the Court no longer includes a Justice cast in the Scalia mold. 
See, e.g., Irin Carmon, Justice Ginsburg’s Cautious Radicalism, N.Y.TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/justice-ginsburgs-cautious-radicalism
.html (noting that Justice Scalia’s “fury on the bench” had by then “intensified,” and 
reporting that Justice Ginsburg had suggested that he “tone down” his dissents because he 
would be “more effective” if he were “not so polemical”).  
481. 28 U.S.C. § 331.  
482. See, e.g., Carmon, supra note 480 (reporting that “Justice Ginsburg likes to say she 
is still a teacher” and that she “‘tr[ies] to teach through [her] opinions’”). 
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to teach a generation of Americans that incivility in judicial 
writing is acceptable at the highest levels. A regrettable legacy 
indeed. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In the current atmosphere of vituperative public discourse 
and misconduct by celebrities, senior corporate officers, political 
leaders, and even respected appellate judges, Congress will 
continue to debate initiatives to address improper judicial 
conduct. Existing means of judicial self-regulation have proved 
insufficient. The federal judiciary must take affirmative steps to 
address all inappropriate judicial behavior—intemperance 
included.
Dissent need not rely on the invective, insult, and bullying 
that were all too common in the Scalia years. These rhetorical 
devices deaden our sense of proportion and our sense of 
decency. The decline in civility of public discourse did not begin 
with the last election cycle or the partisan deadlock in today’s 
Congress. But perhaps the first few disrespectful Scalia dissents 
helped pave the way—not just for his increasingly vitriolic 
dissents later in life, but also for the remarkable decline in the 
level of public discourse generally.483
Disrespectful language has no place in the work of the 
federal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court.484 Many 
Supreme Court Justices over the years have publicly expressed 
support for civility and professionalism.  But Justice Scalia 
never did. Instead, he kept turning out dissents rife with 
intemperance and invective. Some observers might justifiably 
483. President Trump, known for the belligerence of his own rhetoric, was among 
Justice Scalia’s admirers. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, Pres. of the U.S., Remarks by 
President Trump and Justice Gorsuch at Swearing-in of Justice Gorsuch to the Supreme 
Court, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/ 
remarks-president-trump-justice-gorsuch-swearing-justice-gorsuch-supreme-court/ (calling 
Justice Scalia “a terrific judge and a terrific person”). 
484. See Thode, supra note 371, at 400 (observing that opinion-writing is within the 
reach of the ABA Model Code (citing In re Rome, 542 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1975) (sanctioning 
judge for issuing an opinion mocking the defendant’s livelihood)).  
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regard the Court’s failure to stem the negative impact as silent 
acquiescence in Justice Scalia’s incivility and disrespect.485
The Scalia era is over, but his regrettable legacy remains 
for all time in the Court’s published opinions. It is up to the 
Supreme Court to embrace a standard for judicial opinions that 
exemplifies civility and professionalism. As every lawyer and 
every judge knows, “I respectfully dissent” rings true only for 
dissents that reflect measured, judicious, and civil disagreement 
with the views of the majority. 
485. Justice Ginsburg encouraged Justice Scalia to moderate the disrespectful language 
in his opinions. Carmon, supra note 480. Other Justices perhaps made similar attempts, but 
no evidence suggests that the Court took action to curb Justice Scalia’s intemperance. Yet 
bullies get away with bullying because good people stand by and do nothing. See, e.g.,
Martha Minow, Upstanders, Whistle-Blowers, and Rescuers, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 815, 
815–16 (explaining that a “bystander” is a person “who is near but does not take part in 
what is happening,” while an “upstander,” is just the opposite: someone who speaks out 
against injustice, including those who “resist the temptations of silence and passivity” in 
the face of injustice).
